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ABSTRACT 
 
This work asks how and for whom humiliation can be therapeutic. J. M. Coetzee, in his 
works Waiting for the Barbarians, Life & Times of Michael K and Disgrace, does not simply 
critique the mentality of Empire, an “Enlightenment” or colonialist mode of knowing that 
knows no bounds to reason, but offers an alternative through the Magistrate, Michael K and 
David Lurie, all of whom are brutally shamed and “abjected”. Each character, I propose, 
experiences a Lacanian “therapy of humiliation” resulting in a subversion of their egos, 
which they come to understand as antagonistic, a site of misrecognition.  In doing so, these 
characters confront limitation, whether by means of a Lacanian “death drive” or the 
abjection of the self. I argue, this subversion of their egos necessitates a return to the 
humility of the body resulting in a new ethical openness to others and an engagement with 
the world through “care” or “love” or “beauty” which manifests as careful negotiation and 
attentiveness. Confrontation with death, thus, allows the Magistrate, Michael K and David 
Lurie to slough off “Enlightenment” values in favor of an anti-humanist way of living. 
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INTRODUCTION 
J.M. Coetzee as Anti-Romantic 
 
 J. M. Coetzee’s fiction largely refuses definition.  His work refuses the assertions of 
literary critics to pigeonhole it within the confines of genre or a national tradition. In J.M. 
Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing, David Attwell, the foremost critic on Coetzee’s 
fiction, writes that Coetzee “draws on the European heritage – in particular, on novelists of 
high modernism and early postmodernism” (4). In this vein, Coetzee has cited authors in the 
modernist and post-modernist tradition as influences: Franz Kafka, Samuel Beckett, Ford 
Madox Ford, and Maria Rilke. While Coetzee is open with respect to his efforts to continue 
this tradition, his relationship to his homeland South Africa and South African literature has 
been far tenser. In his “Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech”, he described the literature of 
his homeland as “a literature in bondage”. Coetzee through his literature seeks to move 
beyond a specific political situation or temporality or historicity that confines most literature. 
Coetzee’s works seek to move beyond or outside of the compass of national-racial 
signification. As such, South Africa as a locale is largely absent in Coetzee’s novels. Most 
obviously, Waiting for the Barbarians is set in an unnamed, non-specific Empire that refuses to 
be fixed to any particular locality. Notably, this 1980 novel, which was written during one of 
the bleakest moments in the history of South Africa, resists the imperative to national 
allegory. Even when South Africa as a locale is present, in novels such as Life & Times of 
Michael K and Disgrace, it is often displaced by “extranational locales, […] postmodern 
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narration, and striking displacement of apartheid and its aftermath to fictionalized analyses 
of global evil and global terror” (Cooppan 201). 
 This displacement has brought Coetzee under intense criticism from fellow South 
African novelists and critics. Attwell suggest that he is not very popular in South Africa: “I 
don’t think the majority of South Africans know who he is” (Carroll). Meanwhile, Tim du 
Plessis, the editor of Rapport, a national South African Sunday newspaper, posits that 
Coetzee’s representations of the violence of South Africa’s recent past are unfair. Specifically 
he argues that the gang rape of Lucy Lurie in Disgrace paints an unfairly negative portrait of 
post-apartheid South Africa: “The novel was not politically correct […] Some thought South 
Africa didn’t need a renowned author sending out a negative message about the country at 
that time” (Riding). However, such criticism misses the point of Coetzee’s fiction; namely, 
that he is attempting to move past national signification: “A fundamental theme in Coetzee’s 
novels involves the values and conduct resulting from South Africa’s apartheid system, 
which, in his view, could arise anywhere” (Riding). In fact, Coetzee’s fiction strives to move 
outside of history all together. In “The Novel Today”, a lecture delivered by Coetzee, he 
protested “the colonization of the novel by the discourse of history” embracing alternatively 
a narrative that does not record historical truth. Here, the ethical nature of Coetzee’s 
response to South Africa’s apartheid history becomes clear:  in attempting not to follow 
history by representing the apartheid state’s atrocities, Coetzee seeks to interrupt that history. 
So overwhelming is the violence of apartheid that there is, as Coetzee once put it, “too much 
truth for art to hold, truth by the bucketful” (“Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech”). As 
such, Coetzee has chosen not have his art reduced to a simple supplement of history. 
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 Rather than fixing his characters into a specific historicity, Coetzee seeks instead to 
relate the human condition. For Coetzee, much like his modernist and postmodern 
influences Kafka and Beckett, the human condition is defined by lack. This lack is most 
evident in the sex relations in Coetzee’s novels. Coetzee’s novel Disgrace begins, with respect 
to the protagonist David Lurie, as such, “[f]or a man of his age, fifty-two, he has, to his 
mind, solved the problem of sex rather well” (1). David thinks he has solved this problem by 
forming a relationship with Soraya, a tall, slim and dark prostitute, who, for the past year, he 
has met every Thursday. This apparent solution becomes problematized quite quickly. First 
and foremost, she is many years his junior, making David technically “old enough to be her 
father” (1). These Oedipal overtones take on an ominous tone when David remembers the 
last chorus of Oedipus: “Call no man happy until he is dead” (2). Furthermore, David remarks 
less than enthusiastically on their physical intimacy: “Were he to choose a totem, it would be 
the snake. Intercourse between Soraya and himself must be, he imagines rather like the 
copulation of snakes: lengthy, absorbed, but rather abstract, dry, even at its hottest” (2-3). 
Thus, David has far from solved the problem of sex. In fact, sex presents itself as a problem 
throughout the novel. First, with respect to David, who describes himself as a “servant of 
Eros”, a bondage that David callously employs as a defense after raping his student Melanie 
Isaacs; David says, during his hearing before the university, that he acted on the “rights of 
desire” (52). Then, later, when his daughter Lucy is gangraped on her own farm, an act that 
leaves her pregnant. As such, Coetzee seems to posit that there is no relation between the 
sexes. This thematic thread runs throughout his novels, particularly Waiting for the Barbarians, 
in which the Magistrate seems, much like David, to have solved the problem of sex through 
relations with prostitutes only to have these relations complicated by the barbarian girl, who 
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causes him to question and spurn his own desire, and Life & Times of Michael K, in which 
Michael K admits, at first, to not having women friends before, at the end of the novel, 
having sex unwillingly with a prostitute. 
 This notion put forward by Coetzee that there is no relation between the sexes runs 
counter to fiction centered on the “marriage plot”. The marriage plot is a narrative that 
focuses almost exclusively on the courtship rituals between a man and a woman that finds 
fruition through the overcoming of obstacles blocking their eventual nuptials. Such fiction 
was particularly popular and prevalent during the Victorian period with authors such as Jane 
Austen and George Eliot. One of the most famous examples is Austen’s Pride and Prejudice. 
In this novel, the marriage plot centers on the protagonist Elizabeth Bennet, and Mr. 
(Fitzwilliam) Darcy. The impediments or obstacles to romantic happiness that keep 
Elizabeth and Darcy from marrying are, in fact, Elizabeth’s own hasty, harsh and mistaken 
judgments. Elizabeth’s initial prejudice causes her to think of Darcy as overly proud and 
overly conscious of his social status. Additionally, society poses obstacles to this courtship, 
including Lady Catherine’s attempt to control Darcy and George Wickham’s act of deceit. 
However, after having his marriage proposal rejected by Elizabeth, Darcy becomes a more 
sympathetic character, as his humility and the nobility of his character become more 
apparent. Eventually, Elizabeth realizes the error of her ways, and marries Darcy. In this act, 
Elizabeth and Darcy are both transformed because of one another, and despite their 
environment and surroundings. In this way, Austen posits not only that there is relation 
between the sexes, but also that love allows one to overcome even the most difficult of 
environmental complications. 
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 Coetzee’s novels trouble any conception of a “marriage plot”, as not only does love 
not exist, but also the environmental circumstances are overwhelmingly bleak and violent. In 
fact, Coetzean characters are constantly faced with the threat of humiliation. The OED 
defines humiliation as the “action of humiliating or condition of being humiliated; humbling, 
abasement”. Humiliation can further mean “to lose one’s respect for oneself, to have one’s 
pride injured by an agent that is external to oneself. Humiliation is a condition imposed on 
the human being, a condition that at once humbles and shames. It brings with it a feeling 
that one is no longer in control” (Nashef 1). Humiliation runs throughout Coetzee’s novels, 
becoming the main focus of many of these works. In this thesis, I focus on the primary 
factor that contributes to the humiliation of the Coetzean character: language, or more 
specifically the loss of language. I examine three of his novels, Waiting for the Barbarians, Life 
& Times of Michael K and Disgrace, focusing on how the torture that the Magistrate endures, 
how David Lurie’s failed desire to understand and relate to his daughter’s rape, and how 
Michael K’s inability to express himself all emphasize a poverty of language, as each 
character is stripped of his voice. Such a state is humiliating, in that, each is humbled and 
shamed by the fact they can no longer control their environment through language. 
 A central feature of the humiliation that the Coetzean character endures is a stripping 
down to the bare minimum, past language, where only the body, the corporeal remains. In 
this way, these characters are stripped past what it means to be human, becoming animals, 
beasts. The humiliation and shame these characters experience results in a stripping away of 
their dignity, agency and being, enacting a struggle to live as humans rather than animals. At 
first, this struggle seems like a losing proposition, as these characters teeter on the edge of 
becoming animal. The Magistrate, as he endures the humiliation and shame of torture at the 
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hands of the Empire, remarks: “I guzzle my food like a dog. A beastial life is turning me into 
a beast” (87). Michael K, meanwhile, resents how Empire attempts to turn him into an 
animal: “They want to hear about all the cages I have lived in, as if I were a budgie or a white 
mouse or a monkey” (181). Furthermore, his response to Empire is to turn into a beast, as 
he imagines burrowing “like a mole or an earthworm” into the earth (182). As an advocate 
of animal rights, Coetzee aspires to a society in which human beings can “have dignity that 
sets them apart from animals and consequently protects them from being treated like 
animals” (Giving Offense 14). However, in Coetzee’s novels, “[t]o be humiliated as a beast, to 
become animal, is to occupy the position that some humans have allocated to animals, an 
inferior position that some humans have allocated to animals, an inferior position, inviting 
maltreatment” (Nashef 2). As such, to become an animal is not to be treated with dignity but 
rather to be treated like a thing that deserves shaming, humiliation and torture. 
 In answering the question, what it means to be human, Coetzee’s fiction posits that 
human existence is marked by deprivation, a deprivation that leads to a paucity of language 
and the threat of becoming animal. Furthermore, this reduction past language and past even 
what it means to be human brings about shame and humiliation. In this way, Coetzee’s 
characters confront limitations. They are humiliated when they confront the limits of their 
understanding: the Magistrate by the marked barbarian girl, Michael K by his sexual 
confrontation with the prostitute, and David by his inability to relate to Lucy after her rape. 
Crucially, the humiliation of confronting limitation does lead to positive effects on the 
characters. These effects are subtle: they takes place over time, they result from something 
done to them and something that they do, and it affects their psyche – emotionally, 
intellectually, etc. – which we see in moments of insight that gradually coalesce into a new 
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moral outlook that shifts their moral compass. Ultimately, while these transformations are 
difficult to describe because they involve both a self-loss and a self-transformation that are 
closely related, they, ultimately, as I will show, manifest as an ethos of carefulness and 
attentiveness with respect to these characters’ relationship to the world. 
 In order to explicate my argument concerning limitations and transformations, I 
draw on 20th-century continental philosophy, namely the work of Martin Heidegger and the 
work of psychoanalytic thinkers, such as Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva. Heidegger’s 
notion of Da-sein helps to explain how the limits that mortality sets on beings can lead to a 
more authentic mode of living predicated on care, while Lacan’s notion of Das ding, or “the 
Thing”, likewise, helps to explain how a nondestructive relation to a point beyond language, 
all possible meaning giving, in other words, death, can allow for a mode of living predicated 
on beauty. Kristeva’s work on the notion of abjection, meanwhile, explicates the ways in which 
an individual can distance himself from a past symbolic system in favor of a new less corrupt 
language, or manner of communication. 
 I also want to point out that in making this argument, I diverge from the work of 
Hania A.M. Nasheef, in his book The Politics of Humiliation in the Novels of J.M. Coetzee, who 
also analysis Coetzee’s fiction through the under-researched and largely unwritten on 
paradigm of humiliation. But, while Nashef grants that humiliation can lead to some “small 
successes”, he generally finds that the humiliation these characters undergo is overwhelming 
(6). That is, for Nashef, humiliation “can never be shed […lost] in a purgatorial state, the 
Coetzean character can choose neither life nor death […] they remain paralyzed, unable to 
move” (6). 
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 I, by contrast, argue in this thesis that humiliation is therapeutic for these characters. 
While humiliation is rarely therapeutic, as evidenced with respect to other Coetzean 
characters, and while I am not advocating employing humiliation as a form of therapy, for 
these three characters, the Magistrate, Michael K and David Lurie, humiliation acts 
therapeutically. For the Magistrate and David, humiliation allows them to distance 
themselves from a language complicit with Empire and caught in an outmoded form of 
language based in colonialism, respectively. For Michael, meanwhile, humiliation allows him 
to speak, to finally gain a voice. In this way, then, through these characters, a hope opens up 
in the bleak Coetzean world. While these characters may suffer and the future may seem 
bleak they still press on towards the unknown, confronting their limitations and 
transforming themselves for the better in the process. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Dying to Care: Reading with Carefulness and 
Attentiveness in Waiting for  the Barbarians 
 
 “What has made it impossible for us to live in time like fish in water, like birds in air, 
like children? It is the fault of the Empire!” laments the Magistrate, the narrator-protagonist 
of J. M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians (146). This 1980 novel, which brought Coetzee to 
the world’s attention, and remains, along with Disgrace, his most prominent work, takes 
seriously the possibility of living a life that seems impossible, a life nestled uncomfortably 
but authentically between a rock and a hard-place, between the problematic ethos of Empire 
and an unattainable return to the bliss of childhood ignorance, animal impulses, even, an 
inorganic state. In this way, Coetzee attempts to wrench this nostalgia for into a living in – a 
present given time, during a particular historical moment, within an unnamed Empire. The 
Magistrate reveals the difficulties of such an existence in his caustic response, “Empire has 
created the time of history. Empire has located its existence not in the smooth recurrent 
spinning time of the cycle of the seasons but in the jagged time of rise and fall, of beginning 
and end, of catastrophe […] One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of 
Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era” (146). This emphatic 
epiphany lays bare the Magistrate’s obscure reality, his ethereal existence. Alienation, above 
all, characterizes life in Empire. It reduces reality to matters of fact that Empire writes with a 
“submerged mind”. In this way, Empire’s “created” time ossifies into impenetrable, 
inaccessible documents of history. The Magistrate dreams of “swimming with even, untiring 
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strokes through the medium of time” (157), but his immediate milieu, his corporeal reality 
belies such a vision; the Magistrate can only swim through “a medium more inert than 
water” (157), the parched documents of historical time, and, as such, is left “wading 
[…through] the ooze” (146). This disembodying of the mind of the observer from the world 
which he wades through, gazes at and lives in makes possible Empire’s very legacy, it’s 
prolonged, unending era. 
 In its desire not to end, to prolong, Empire reproduces itself. In Waiting for the 
Barbarians, this reproduction manifests itself in the Empire’s interrogation experts, namely 
Colonel Joll. Coetzee immediately places the reader into the Empire’s labyrinth of dreamy 
myopia in the opening lines of the novel: “I have never seen anything like it: two discs of 
glass suspended in front of his eyes in loops of wire. Is he blind? I could understand it if he 
wanted to hide blind eyes. But he is not blind. The discs are dark, they look opaque from the 
outside, but he can see through them” (1). Confusion reigns over the aging Magistrate’s 
confrontation with the Empire, which we are told he has “not seen […] since […he] was a 
young man” (2). Joll is as abstract as the Empire that he represents. From the form and 
function of his glasses to his very gaze and appearance, Joll in all his opaqueness is, as Debra 
A. Castillo writes, an “emblem of the estrangement of knowledge and law, of law and 
justice” of the Empire (79). Joll also espouses the arrogance and certainty distinctive of the 
Empire. When the Magistrate questions Joll’s ability to garner “truth” through torture, Joll 
answers, “A certain tone enters the voice of a man who is telling the truth. Training and 
experience teach us to recognize that tone” (5). Joll’s “us” marks the privileged Empire from 
the “they” to which the Magistrate belongs. Crucially, no “we” or commonality mediates this 
divide. The Empire fails to instill a sense of shared identity in its subjects. Becoming a 
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member of Empire’s “us” should be an enticing proposition, but in this case Empire fails to 
coerce such a group identity. Joll, acting as the conscience of the Empire, possesses singular 
access to this tone because he has been trained to exert the correct pressure, the correct 
intensity of pain. As such, if “[p]ain is truth”, as the Magistrate concludes, then, “truth” 
belongs to the likes of Joll, the privileged members of the Empire (5). 
 These abstractions and perverse certainties act to engender unrest in the Empire, 
which, according to the Magistrate, “dooms itself to live in history and plot against history” 
(146). In its effort to write history, to favor general over specific, universal over particular, 
stasis over change, the Empire relegates history to a mere record. These records instead of 
promoting inclusive feelings of allegiance and comradeship promote nightmarish thoughts 
of rebellion and death. Admitting that “[n]o one truly believes […] that the world of tranquil 
certainties we were born into is about to be extinguished” (157), the Magistrate’s thoughts 
drift to the Empire’s violent annihilation. This looming extinction takes the spectral form of 
the barbarians, who, the Magistrate predicts, after “each [subject of the Empire meets] his 
own most fitting end […] will wipe their backsides on the town archives” (157). Here, an 
opposition between colonizer, the Empire and its interrogation experts, and the colonized, 
the barbarians, becomes clear, an opposition between “us” and “them”. The assertions of 
power made by Joll and the interrogation experts act to intensify, not feelings of allegiance 
and comradeship, but rather a sense of vulnerability on the part of the Magistrate, who, 
while acting as a functionary of the Empire, begins to question this role. The Empire, thus, 
engenders the “waiting” of the novel’s title. In this waiting we see the perfect example of the 
stalemate produced by Empire, which dreams of how not to die, rather than how to live. 
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 Coetzee’s portrayal of Empire critiques a particular mentality. Such a mentality is 
manifested in the institutions and ways of life of the Empire that last and live on, providing 
hope to Empire’s dream of eternal order1. Empire, for Coetzee, posits an eternal perspective. 
If time is a river, then, Empire situates itself in an eye in the sky or God’s eye perspective 
that – from the shore – can see up and down the river of time. As such, Empire looks 
beyond the dirt in the ground, the ebb and flow of the ooze, the present historical moment, 
even time itself. Such a worldview or eternal perspective, what might be called “knowledge”, 
“truth”, or “reason”, becomes stable across time. Coetzee’s critique of Empire bares 
particular resemblance to the critique Martin Heidegger levies against the conventional 
worldview of Western metaphysics. One form of Western metaphysics is commonly referred 
to as the “Enlightenment”, a loose characterization of those metaphysical perspectives that 
flowered and flourished during the 17th-century. Along these lines, Coetzee’s critique of 
Empire can best be understood as a critique of the legacy of Western metaphysics, 
specifically an Enlightenment-based rationalism that exalts the universality of “reason” only 
to sustain white male European supremacy. “Reason”, that is, as a tool of control, 
oppression, domination and humiliation. Dominic Head supports such a reading, arguing 
that Coetzee’s omission of the definite article widens the connotations of the portentously 
termed “Empire”, “which becomes available as an emblem of imperialism through history” 
(72). Ultimately, then, Coetzee, on the one hand, indicts the colonial system founded on a 
“reason” that knows no bounds and, on the other hand, examines the way in which this 
perspective deforms and deadens the human psyche, constituting a break between the 
subject and the world. Coetzee does not simply scorn Enlightenment and colonial values but 
                                                1	  These institutions are more concretely attacked in Coetzee’s novel Life & Times of 
Michael K, which I discuss in the second chapter. 	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usefully puts something in their place. In this chapter, I propose that, through his depiction 
of the Magistrate, Coetzee reveals how sloughing off Enlightenment values can reveal a way 
of living constituted by an ethics of carefulness and attentiveness that the Magistrate acquires 
during his moral transformation. 
 Coetzee, in his essay “Into the Dark Chamber”, describes Waiting for the Barbarians as 
“about the impact of the torture chamber on the life of a man of conscience” (13). The 
novel takes place in an undefined place and time. At the novel’s beginning, we find the 
Magistrate habitually performing his duties in an outpost of the Empire. The arrival of 
Colonel Joll disrupts the peace of the Magistrate’s once “quiet life in quiet times” (8). Joll 
arrives to investigate the possibility of an uprising by the barbarians, who are believed to be 
preparing for an attack against the Empire. The Magistrate begins to question the purpose 
and validity of this investigation when Joll and his interrogation experts capture, interrogate, 
and torture a large group of clearly innocent fishing people and keep them as prisoners. 
When these practitioners leave the outpost, the Magistrate takes in a young barbarian girl left 
scarred and partially blinded by torture. While the Magistrate admits that he feels “no desire” 
(32) towards her, he cannot let her go until the marks on her “body are deciphered and 
understood” (33). Later, as he writes, “[t]o repair some of the damage wrought by the forays 
of the Third Bureau”, he journeys into barbarian territory to take her back to her people 
(62). Upon his return to the outpost, he finds that the army has arrived in preparation for a 
preemptive attack against the barbarians. The Magistrate is imprisoned and tortured after 
being wrongly accused of treason for his transgression with the barbarian girl. He is 
eventually restored to his position when Joll and his men leave the outpost. The novel ends 
inconclusively with a battalion led by Joll sent to confront the barbarian “enemies” being 
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dispersed in the desert and returning without ever reaching their target, and the anticipated 
invasion of the Empire never taking place. Waiting for the Barbarians, thus, records the 
Magistrate’s confrontation with the brutal ideals and methods of the Empire. 
 This confrontation is troubled by his muddling middle, even liminal position that the 
Magistrate occupies. He serves the Empire but his burgeoning “sympathy” for the barbarian 
“victims” leads him into questioning the “truths”, or mode of knowing characteristic of 
imperial discourse and practices. Yet, despite his commiseration, he cannot simply switch 
sides because his position in life is not a choice to be made. The Magistrate recognizes his 
complicity with the Empire; he has been interpolated as a subject by the authoritative 
discourse of the Empire that he serves, and which, because it is external to his “being”, 
cannot easily be discarded. Still, his sympathy with the barbarians does lead him into a 
quixotic act of rebellion that lands him in prison, branded as an enemy of the state. The 
Magistrate, by returning the barbarian girl to her people, ultimately, chooses to betray his 
commitments and transgress the law of the Empire. 
 Whether this rebellious act ultimately leads to failure or redemption has been the 
subject of much criticism. Critics have tended to focus their attention on the Magistrate’s 
growing awareness of the evil imperial mindset in which he is complicit and of the difficulty 
of trying to break free. Many critics read this struggle as a failed awareness, the development 
of a false consciousness that dooms the Magistrate to complicity with the Empire. For 
instance, in The Novels of J. M. Coetzee: Lacanian Allegories, an early critical collection on 
Coetzee’s fiction, Teresa Dovey argues that the Magistrate progresses from “a position of 
‘sight’, or superior vision, to a position of ‘blindness’” (219). Similarly, David Atwell, perhaps 
the world's foremost authority on Coetzee, understands the position with which the 
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Magistrate concludes the narrative as “that of suspension in ignorance, of simply not knowing” 
(84). While Atwell understands this subjectivity as a somewhat positive “positional response” 
to power, he still describes the Magistrate’s position as characterized by “stupidity” (86). 
More recently, Troy Urquhart continues this line of criticism as he interprets the Magistrate’s 
concern for the barbarians as self-interested, “he begins to confuse justice with penance […] 
his desire to save the victim of Empire with his desire to save himself” (11-12) and in the 
end unsuccessful, “he is confined by the ideological position of Imperial Magistrate, he 
cannot escape it and occupy the position of the other” (13). 
 In this chapter, I propose an alternative reading. Coetzee paints his portrait of the 
Magistrate with subtle stokes that make his development difficult to grasp. He does not 
imbue the Magistrate’s narrative with pathos; the Magistrate does not meet a tragic or 
heartwarming end. Neither does the Magistrate “go native”; the Magistrate can never fully 
share in the barbarian’s history or occupy there position: “Let it at least be said […] that in 
this farthest outpost of the Empire of light there existed one man who in his heart was not a 
barbarian” (104). While it is tempting to say that the Magistrate discovers a simple negation 
of the Enlightenment project, such a development would lead to a no less positive position 
of ignorance. That is, such a reading would miss the positives, his “triumph over his [own] 
ignorance” (Spencer 10). The Magistrate does not simply adopt a position of unknowing, 
instead Coetzee shows us what a position between the extremes of knowing and unknowing 
might look, how such a position might be lived. I argue that, through a confrontation with 
abjection and death, the Magistrate experiences a “therapy of humiliation” that opens him 
up to a less systematic and harmonious perspective predicated on, what Martin Heidegger 
terms Sorge, or “care”, which manifests as a careful and attentive reading of the world. 
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Although suffering is ubiquitous, the Magistrate’s humiliation is special. That is, while 
deplorable, it is also uniquely productive, as the moments of sympathy and insight that arise 
from the humiliation and torture in his life coalesce into a new moral attitude of carefulness 
and attentiveness. By loosening his grip on his ego and reason, the Magistrate at long last 
opens himself to his world and his time, experience and sensation, humanity and otherness, 
and above all living. 
 While he questions the practices of the Empire, early in the novel, the Magistrate’s 
relationship with the barbarian girl belies his own oppositional statements and actions. The 
Magistrate treats the tortured bodies of Joll’s victims, especially the damaged eyes and 
broken ankles of the barbarian girl, like texts that need to be written, read and deciphered. 
As he does with the white poplar slips that he excavates, the Magistrate attempts to turn the 
barbarian girl’s body with the marks of torture impressed upon it into a sign from which he 
will extract the truth. His relationship with the barbarian girl does not basically deviate from 
the practice of Colonel Joll and the Empire’s interrogation experts: “I behave in some ways 
like a lover – I undress her, I bathe her, I stroke her, I sleep beside her – but I might equally 
well tie her to a chair and beat her, it would be no less intimate” (46). In this way, the 
Magistrate inscribes himself onto her body. In another way, his attempts to translate her 
marked, tortured body resemble the colonizer’s attitude toward the colonized: “[U]ntil the 
marks on this girl’s body are deciphered and understood I cannot let go of her” (33). It is no 
coincidence, then, as suggested by Maria Boletsi, “that the novel begins with a description of 
Colonel Joll’s sunglasses in which the narrator can see a reflection of himself” (79). Still, the 
Magistrate does reveal sentiments of dissatisfaction at his complicity with the Empire’s mode 
of knowing and style of reasoning, crying out: “No! No! No! […I] am seducing myself, out of 
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vanity, into these meanings and correspondences […] How can I believe that a bed is 
anything but a bed, a women’s body anything but a site of joy? I must assert my distance 
from Colonel Joll! I will not suffer for his crimes!” (47-48) 
 Despite his repeated efforts, the Magistrate fails in his attempts to read and decipher 
the barbarian girl’s marked body. Her body is impenetrable and incomprehensible, as if 
closed off to him “without aperture, without entry” (45). The Magistrate is unsuccessful in 
his attempts to reconstruct her appearance from his memory: “[W]here the girls should be, 
there is space, a blankness” (51). She remains unknown, inscrutable, an other. Likewise, the 
barbarian girl remains an enigma with respect to the Magistrate’s desire. He cannot 
understand why or even if he desires her at all: “[O]f this one there is nothing I can say with 
certainty. There is no link I can define between her womanhood and my desire. I cannot 
even say for sure that I desire her” (46). This lack of desire manifests itself as impotency. In 
fact, the Magistrate’s sexual impotency is connected to the impotency of writing, a 
connection that works both ways. On the one hand, he finds it “appropriate that a man who 
does not know what to do with the woman in his bed should not know what to write” (58). 
On the other hand, “in the middle of the sexual act […he loses his] way like a storyteller 
losing the thread of his story” (45). The barbarian girl, thus, is asymptotic, a limit to both 
meaning and desire. Here, the dilemma of the novel presents itself: whether, if we 
understand that there can be no meaning outside the order of language, the Magistrate can 
somehow occupy an autonomous place in what psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan calls the 
“symbolic” dimension or order. In other words, whether he can live in Empire without 
thinking or acting like Empire. As we shall see, the Magistrate’s evolving relationship with 
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the barbarian girl ultimately allows him to assert his distance from the Empire and open up 
such a place or position for himself.  
 The Magistrate’s evolving relationship with the barbarian girl is best exemplified in 
the series of six dreams he has of her. The first dream, which occurs after Joll arrives but 
before he becomes conscious of her presence, foreshadows her blankness, her otherness, as 
the Magistrate tries “to imagine the face between the petals of her peaked hood but cannot” 
(10). The second dream occurs after he has taken her in, and in it the Magistrate, as he does 
when he sees her begging, gives her a coin, a sign of his compassion and guilt. In the third 
dream the Magistrate sees the girl like he has “never seen her, [as] a smiling child”, as she 
was before she was tortured (57). The next two dreams, which occur after the Magistrate has 
returned, but before he is hung from the mulberry tree, represent the promise of a shift in 
the Magistrate’s conscience. In the fourth dream he comforts her, while in the fifth dream 
she offers him a gift of freshly baked bread, which, according to Dick Penner, is “a gesture 
as suggestive of a sacrament as his washing and oiling of her feet” (83). The final dream is 
the most hopeful: “For an instant I have a vision of her face, the face of a child, glowing, 
healthy, smiling on me without alarm, before we collide […] The bump is as faint as the 
stroke of a moth. I am flooded with relief. ‘Then I need not have been anxious after all’ I 
think” (149). These dreams trace the Magistrate’s burgeoning ethical awareness, as he forms 
a nondestructive relation to the barbarian girl. 
 The Magistrate’s confrontation with limitation is most evident in his quixotic act of 
rebellion, his act of taking the barbarian girl back to her people. In this act, the Magistrate 
confronts that which is precisely nothing, most beyond this world, the absolute master – 
death. Castillo interprets the Magistrate’s penetration of the walls of the frontier town as an 
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approach towards death: “despite his love [for the barbarian girl], despite his act of 
possession on the eve of loss, [he] does not pass the threshold of the barbarian territory 
(woman or mountain), he halts and does not cross that final frontier before death” (88-89). 
In his confrontation with a “hemorrhage of being, a loss of his image of the self” (Castillo 
88), we can recognize the Magistrate as upholding a certain position, that of “not giving way 
on one’s desire”. In a Lacanian sense, he obeys the “law” of pure desire. That is, his desire 
aims at the Thing2, or death, which cannot be expressed by any signifier. His behavior “is a 
matter here of the evocation of what is in effect of the order of the law, but which is 
developed in no signifying chain, in nothing” (Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 278). 
Therefore, the Magistrate’s desire for the barbarian girl can best be understood as a “death 
drive”. But, how so? How can we understand the Magistrate as in the grips of the “death 
drive”, one of the most seemingly incoherent and controversial of psychoanalytic concepts? 
 Sigmund Freud aligns his notion of the death drive closely to biology. In a locus 
classicus from “The Economic Problem of Masochism”, Freud writes: “In (multicellular) 
organisms the libido meets the instinct of death, or destruction, which is dominant in them 
and which seeks to disintegrate the cellular organism and to conduct each separate 
unicellular organism [composing it] into a state of inorganic stability” (163). While the libido 
can act to divert the death instinct or drive outwards towards objects in the external world, 
the goal of this drive, according to Freud, is to bring the living being back to the inorganic 
state. For Lacan, who adopted this notion from Freud, the death drive is not purely a 
biological fact. Instead, it relates to the symbolic order – that dimension of symbolization 
into which the human being’s body must translate itself in order to speak – which strives for 
                                                
2 I will further explicate the Lacanian Thing in my analysis of Coetzee’s novel Life & Times of 
Michael K, which I discuss in the second chapter. 
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homeostatic balance but is disrupted by an object that will not integrate into the symbolic 
order, in other words, the Thing. And, what, at this level, is the death drive? The death in 
desire as a death drive is a “second death”. That is, according to Lacan, in The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, “death insofar as it is regarded as the point at which the very cycles of the 
transformations of nature are annihilated” (248). In other words, the “second death” is the 
possible annihilation of the symbolic texture through which “reality” is constituted. Along 
these lines, Slavoj Žižek, in The Sublime Object of Ideology, interprets the “second death” as a 
“symbolic death”: “not the death of the so-called ‘real object’ in its symbol, but the 
obliteration of the signifying network” (147). While, as Žižek admits, there is no escape from 
the symbolic order, the “second death” holds the radical possibility for this “real object” of 
occupying an autonomous place in the symbolic order. 
 In Waiting for the Barbarians, the Magistrate puts himself on the verge of the “second 
death”, as death seems to break in on or overtake his life. Early in the novel, the Magistrate 
appears ready to succumb to death, describing himself as feeling “like a man who, in the grip 
of the undertow, gives up the fight, stops swimming, and turns his face towards the open sea 
and death” (22) Then, later in the novel, he admits to feeling like he has “already died one 
death” (138). The Magistrate makes this latter comment after he has been tortured in an 
episode where he is strung up on a mulberry tree and publicly humiliated. Menàn Du Plessis 
describes this traumatic event as a liberating moment in the Magistrate’s life: “[I]n a strangely 
dream-like sense, this is a kind of death. After this incident the magistrate is freed and 
allowed to resume his old way of life. There is a persistent sense, however, that something 
has ended” (124). The “kind of death” that Du Plessis describes sounds very much like what 
Lacan defines as “second death”. After all, this death breaks in or overtakes the Magistrate 
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after he comes into contact with the Thing, the barbarian girl, as he is imprisoned and later 
tortured for transgressing the law of the Empire by “treasonously consorting with the enemy” 
(85; emphasis added). By coming into contact with the Thing without losing himself or being 
destroyed, the Magistrate’s relation to the symbolic order is paradoxically both “freed” and 
“ended”. That is, his relation to the proper, familiar world is loosened and his own ego is 
subverted. 
 The Empire’s modus operandi is humiliation. The Magistrate is forced to perform 
degrading acts for a public audience, and as such is shamed by the Empire. The Magistrate 
says, “It cost me agonies of shame the first time I had to come out of my den and stand 
naked before these idlers or jerk my body about for their amusement” (128). This public 
shaming is soon superseded by an even worse humiliation, a loss of knowledge. What the 
Magistrate is truly ashamed of is the possibility of dying an ignorant man: “What I shrink 
from, I believe, is the shame of dying as stupid and befuddled as I am” (103). The Empire’s 
most effective torture is, as such, revealed to be the lack of meaning provided to the 
Magistrate for his sufferings. The Magistrate makes an appeal to the authority of history, 
screaming, “History will bear me out!” (125). However, Colonel Joll does not even allow him 
a place in the history of the Empire, responding, “But who is going to put you in the history 
books? […] There will be no history, the affair is too trivial” (125). Speechless, the 
Magistrate’s language, place in history, even his subjectivity is robbed by the Empire. 
 The Magistrate is reduced past shame, past knowing, past language, even past what it 
means to be human. When he is strung up on a mulberry tree, the primary source of his 
humiliation is that he is forced to dress like a woman. In this way, the Magistrate experiences 
abjection. According to Julia Kristeva, “abjection of self would be the culminating form of 
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that experience of the subject to which it is revealed that all its objects are based merely on 
the inaugural loss that laid the foundations of its own being.” (5). In other words, abjection 
is the expression of both a division and a merging, whether between subject and body, or 
self and Other (object, the social). Hania A. M. Nashef, in The Politics of Humiliation in the 
Novels of J. M. Coetzee, finds that by being turned “into a woman […the Magistrate is] no 
longer fully human, but en route to becoming an object” (98; emphasis added). In turning the 
Magistrate into a woman, an object, the Empire makes the Magistrate aware of his body, 
“what it means to live in a body, as a body, a body which can entertain notions of justice 
only as long as it is whole and well” (126). Moreover, Caroline Rooney suggests that “torture 
deprives the other of truth in reducing awareness to the extreme sensations of the body” 
(200). Thereby, the Magistrate learns that “the meaning of humanity” is not found in 
concepts like “justice” and “truth”, which can so easily be manipulated (126). 
 This experience of abjection or humiliation is therapeutic for the Magistrate in that it 
allows him to both distance himself from Colonel Joll and his men and the inadequate 
imperial modes of knowing and ways of reasoning, and slough off the Enlightenment values 
that characterize the Empire. In this way, the Magistrate’s ego, which, for Freud, is the seat 
of reason, can be understood as subverted or undermined. Late in the novel, he makes a 
concerted effort to evade the cogito ergo sum, René Descartes’ famous Enlightenment notion: I 
think therefore I am. The Magistrate stutters around the edge of the cogito, repeating “I think” 
but never allowing himself to stop thinking, to assert truth, to ossify his being into an object, 
a thing. For Castillo, “the magistrate is forced to acknowledge […the Empire’s] power, and, 
fascinated by the intenable perverted products of the power ploys, the magistrate himself 
perverts language to avoid the unsavory cogito ergo sum” (89). In fact, the Magistrate ends 
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this “thinking” by refusing to reason, to come to a conclusion: “I think: ‘There has been 
something staring me in the face and still I do not see it” (170). The Magistrate experiences a 
Lacanian form of therapy. For Lacan, the ego is a site of méconnaissance, misrecognition3, and 
therefore, rather than strengthened, should be subverted in therapy. But, if we understand 
the Magistrate as subverting his ego and reason, then, what replaces it? That is, if the 
Magistrate does open up an autonomous position for himself in the symbolic order, how 
does this position look? How does one live with a subverted ego? 
 Since there is no solution to or escape from the symbolic order, the thing to do, in 
the words of Žižek, is “to try to articulate a modus vivendi with it” (xxviii). The Magistrate’s 
new modus vivendi, mode or way of living, is revealed through his relationship to the barbarian 
girl. Where the Magistrate once obsessively attempted to decipher her torture marks and 
translate her body into language, his “therapy of humiliation” has opened his self-absorbed 
mind to an otherness that exceeds the mode of knowing and style of reasoning characteristic 
of the Empire. Now, late in his narrative, the Magistrate openly admits that in the past he 
attempted to imperialistically mark her as his own: “Though I cringe with shame, even here 
and now, I must ask myself whether, when I lay head to foot with her, fondling and kissing 
those broken ankles, I was not in my heart of heart regretting that I could not engrave 
myself on her as deeply” (148). The Magistrate finally asserts his distance from Colonel Joll, 
by coming to live with difference, with otherness. 
 At the beginning of the novel, the Magistrate admits that he “stopped […his] ears” 
from hearing the screams of Joll’s victims (9). Later, the Magistrate’s budding care for others 
forces him to the ethical realization that “[s]omewhere, always, a child is being beaten” (88). 
                                                
3 For Lacan’s work on misrecognition in ego formation, see his famous “Mirror Stage” essay, 
75-81, and his seminar Freud’s Papers on Technique, 167 
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This awakening, what the Magistrate describes as “a change in my moral being”, is made 
even more real when he attempts to stop Colonel Joll from beating a group of barbarians 
(47). The Magistrate’s newfound care and ethical awareness become evident in two 
important ways when compared to the scene in which he reprimands himself for attempting 
to make “meanings and correspondences” out of the blank, faceless other, the barbarian girl. 
Whereas in that scene he reprimanded himself for depraving her, in this scene he attempts to 
stop Joll from depraving the barbarian prisoners. For the Magistrate, Joll is depraving these 
prisoners in writing the word “ENEMY” on their backs. In this way, he imposes meaning 
onto the barbarians. That is, he depraves them, by making them out to be immoral or 
wicked. Then, when Joll is about to hit these men with a “four-pound hammer”, the 
Magistrate stops him by saying “No!” (116). The same word he thought to himself when he 
was “depraving” the barbarian girl. In this public utterance and through his actions, we see 
the Magistrate reveal his novel ethical relation to others. He demonstrates a new found care, 
specifically, a care opposed to the Empire’s self-affirming “truth” and “reason”: the 
Magistrate does not want these men to be made into something they are not, “enemies”. 
This care is further exemplified when the Magistrate shouts, “Look at these men! […] Men!” 
(117). Mike Marais, in The Idea of Hospitality in the Fiction of J. M. Coetzee, suggests that the 
Magistrate attempts to “remind the torturers, and their spectators, of the humanity they 
share with the prisoners […making himself thereby] responsible not just for the barbarian 
girl but for all human beings” (31). Thus, where the Magistrate once shielded his eyes and 
ears from the world, he now lives in the world with a care that he realizes must encompass 
others, all others, all of humanity. 
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 This mode of living in the world and burgeoning notion of care connects the 
Magistrate to what Martin Heidegger terms, in his seminal work Being and Time, Da-sein, 
literally, being there, in time. For Heidegger, Western metaphysics dulls beings, or humans, 
by affirming the existence of an ahistorical substance or presence. Such a belief is incorrect, 
according to Heidegger, because it transforms Being into a thing or an object; as such, Being 
needs to be recovered as a process in time. For a being to come to terms with Being he or 
she must, for Heidegger, must acknowledge his or her own mortality, as mortality sets limits 
on beings and therefore reminds them of their deaths. Only in acknowledging mortality, 
Heidegger posits, can a being affirm and actively will their own death, and live in time, 
becoming beings-toward-death. The most authentic manner by which a being can be 
connected to the world is, Heidegger writes at the end of Part One of Being and Time, 
through Sorge, or “care”, that is, a concern and solicitude towards other human beings, or 
Da-seins. 
 The Magistrate’s growing awareness of his surroundings can be understood, in a 
Hedieggerean sense, as the achievement of an authentic modus vivendi. By coming into contact 
with the barbarian girl, the Magistrate experiences a “second death”, but rather than being 
destroyed, it allows him to subvert his ego through a “therapy of humiliation” and separate 
himself from his past imperialistic mode of knowing or “reason”. Thereby, he comes to 
occupy a space where death breaks in on life, which allows him to actively will his own 
death, and ultimately become a being-towards-death, an authentic, ethical, caring being. The 
Magistrate’s newfound care manifests in a new mode of reasoning and living in the world 
constituted by care-fulness and attentive-ness. Instead of reading the world as full of signs that 
reveal some metaphysical truth, he comes to understand that events and other beings 
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demand to be viewed with care and attention and therefore can even challenge or refute 
prevailing “truths”. 
 This transformation is evident with respect to the Magistrate’s hobby of excavation. 
Early in the novel, the Magistrate’s mode of knowing and style of reasoning make him 
complicit with the Empire. For years the Magistrate has pursued a personal quest to excavate 
some ancient ruins that sit two miles due south of the town. Within these ruins he discovers 
a bag of white poplar wood, on which are painted characters in an unknown script. The 
Magistrate attempts to decipher these scripts in every which way: “[I] laid them out, first in 
one great square, then in sixteen smaller squares, then in other combinations […] I have 
even found myself reading the slips in a mirror, or tracing one on top of another, or 
conflating half of one with half of another” (17). Through this insistent and incessant 
deciphering, the Magistrate hopes to find “a map of the land of the barbarians in olden 
times, or a representation of a lost pantheon” (17), but really he awaits a “sign” (17), to feel 
“a special historical poignancy” (18). In other words, the Magistrate seeks an eternal 
perspective, that is, he hoped to discover, in the vacuousness of the desert, the truth of the 
past. In his digging, the Magistrate looks up and down the river of time in hopes of 
unearthing metaphysical truth. 
 Soon, an uneasy sense of complicity digs at the Magistrate’s conscience. Filled with 
despair at his fruitless toiling, the Magistrate admits that his actions are “[v]ain, idle, [and] 
misguided” (18). He begins to understand that “the space […of the ruins] is merely space, no 
meaner or grander than the space above the shacks and tenements and temples and offices 
of the capital” (17). The Magistrate is left with a feeling that no matter how long and no 
matter how deep he excavates he will not find what he is looking for, as “[t]he sign did not 
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come” (17). This image of the Magistrate excavating ancient ruins without being able to find 
a special historical poignancy, fixed meaning, or presence evokes that prominent critic of 
Western Metaphysics Jacques Derrida and his famous essay “Différance”. In this work, 
Derrida compares the Egyptian pyramid with textual meaning: a pyramid announces “the 
death of the tyrant” or pharaoh that it is empty inside just as language always has its own 
death within it since meaning is repeatedly deferred (4). In seeking this meaning but 
discovering in his excavation of the ruins only a lack of meaning, the Magistrate, according 
to Susan Van Zanten Gallagher, “seems to be wandering in the wilderness of deconstructive 
criticism” (279). Understating the Magistrate as a sort of deconstructionist or 
poststructuralist critic – a role we can see through his growing awareness of the slipperiness 
of the signifier – reveals that the novel “treats knowledge and reason with the utmost 
suspicion” (Marais 31). 
 Eventually, the Magistrate’s sense of complicity leads to a moral transformation. This 
transformation is evident when Colonel Joll asks him to arrange and translate the white 
poplar slips that he excavated from the ruins. To the “submerged” mind of Empire, these 
slips contain a coded message through which the Magistrate and the barbarians 
communicate. However, Joll’s desire for verification is intentionally thwarted by the 
Magistrate’s new careful and attentive mode of interpretation. The Magistrate invents a range 
of contradictory meanings, from war to vengeance to justice, which leave the ultimate meaning 
of the slips “open to interpretation” (123). That is, rather than allowing these elusive slips, 
which “can be read in many ways”, to “form an allegory” or represent a single interpretation, 
the Magistrate refuses to fix them into some “truth”, and thereby challenges the Empire’s 
aim of deciphering them according to a schema that produces its own intended meanings 
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and beliefs (122). Robert Spencer puts it another way: “[T]he Magistrate ceases to be the 
author of his world and becomes its reader” (184). Through this act of defiance, the 
Magistrate condemns the transitoriness and violence of an Empire with which he was once 
complicit, but now lives in without thinking and acting like. 
 At the end of the novel, one year, four seasons, after it commenced, the Magistrate 
seems to have come full circle, resuming “the legal administration that was interrupted as 
year ago by the arrival of the Civil Guard” (159). But, his vision both subconscious and 
“real” have changed. These visions are now conflated. His subconscious dream condenses 
into his milieu. Snow begins to fall, as the Magistrate approaches the scene of children 
building a snowman that he has seen so many times in his dream. He feels “inexplicably 
joyful” not because the realization of his dream confirms some “truth” but rather because he 
does not feel the need to comprehend this scene that he once eagerly attempted to decipher 
(170). “Anxious not to alarm them”, he notices that “the snowman will need arms too”, but 
he does “not want to interfere” (170). If we understand this snowman with its armless and 
misshapen body as the other, the Magistrate’s response, then, becomes an act constituted by 
an ethics of carefulness and attentiveness, an ethics that does not affirm similarities but 
rather recognizes differences. The concluding image of the novel represents this hope, the 
promise of a future possibility of acting with care and attention with respect to a world full of 
strange signs, a humanity comprised of mysterious others: the Magistrate “presses on along a 
road that may lead nowhere” (170; emphasis added), to a future beyond the current system 
of symbolization, to a life in which the “truths” of the Empire are subverted, and in doing so 
authentically and ethically engages his world every step of the way. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
The Thing is The Thing is The Thing: Planting the 
Seeds of Resistance in Life & Times o f  Michael  K  
 
 The struggle at the heart of J. M. Coetzee’s novel Waiting for the Barbarians pits the 
Magistrate against his own role and complicity in Empire. The Magistrate does not commit 
willful evil but rather must resist his own passive acceptance of the violent and humiliating 
mode of knowing and style of reasoning characteristic of the Empire. As he says, “’The 
crime that is latent in us we must inflict on ourselves […] ‘Not on others’” (160). 
Consequently, the moral transformation that the Magistrate undergoes manifests itself in 
subtle and often unrecognizable ways, as he occupies the same position at the end of the 
novel as he did at the beginning. The struggle at the heart of Coetzee’s next novel Life & 
Times of Michael K pits Empire against that which is outside its boundaries, that which refuses 
to be known and understood. And, as such, this struggle caries with it a more overt threat to 
the structure and order of Empire, a threat pregnant with the seeds of potential resistance 
and revolution. 
 “Talk, Michael […] You see how easy it is to talk, now talk. Listen to me, listen how 
easy it is to fill this room with words […] Give yourself some substance man, otherwise you 
are going to slide through life absolutely unnoticed”, says a medical officer of the Empire to 
Michael K, the protagonist of Life & Times of Michael K (140). This 1983 novel, which arrived 
after Coetzee’s first three novels had cemented his reputation as an important writer of 
fiction having already earned a bevy of premier literary prizes, including the CNA Award 
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(1977, 1980), the Geoffrey Faber Award (1980), and the James Tait Black Memorial Prize 
(1980) to name a few, enacts a drama between presence and absence, what is heard and what 
is unheard, resistance and capitulation, even life and death. In this way, Coetzee asks what it 
means to be human. In the figure of Michael K this drama is played out in a life and times, a 
becoming, a bildung that is so slight, so quiet that it threatens to disappear, go “unnoticed”. 
On the one hand, this text suggests that human beings are made visible through words. In 
this sense, Michael in his reticence, his poverty of language teeters on extinction. On the 
other hand, the novel makes another suggestion that we are always spoken for that in Empire 
our language, our story is never our own. In this sense, Michael does not have a personal 
voice. In the medical officer’s evocation to Michael to “talk”, to “fill this room with words”, 
the question becomes: whose voice will fill that room? Does the medical officer actually 
want Michael to talk? Or, does he want Michael to “listen” to him, and to reproduce a 
particular discourse, a discourse of Empire? 
 Empire attempts to order the world to assert orderly difference. However, in this 
desire, Empire often dehumanizes. For instance, in the beginning of the novel, the 
authorities of Empire are not given proper names. Instead they are identified by there 
institutional roles: the shopkeeper, the policeman, the nurse, the soldier, and the medical 
officer. In this way, these people are reduced simply to their relationship to authority and 
power. Oppositely, the institutions of Empire are given proper, human names, as if they are 
human: Jakkalsdirf, Kenilworth, and Huis Norenius. Michael K, the protagonist, of the novel 
oscillates uncertainly in Empire between being human and being a faceless functionary. This 
uneasy relationship to authority is seen in his name: he is an individual, Michael, but also 
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something less, K. Even his individuality is regularly effaced, as he is often mistakenly 
referred to as “Michaels”, in official documentation and by the medical officer. 
 The mentality of Empire is also made apparent in the series of institutions or camps 
that Michael progresses through in his narrative. The range of camps is astounding, 
encompassing seemingly every seed of existence, “camps for children whose parents run 
away, camps for people who kick and foam at the mouth, camps for people with big heads 
and people with little heads, camps for people with no visible means of support, camps for 
people chased off the land, camps for people they find living in storm-drains, camps for 
street girls”, etc (182). The institutions of Empire, for Susan Van Zanten Gallagher, act to 
dehumanize by stripping their inhabitants of agency rather than educating, or improving 
their lives: Michael finds “systems of dehumanization at both the resettlement camp and the 
army rehabilitation camp. Allowed to leave the camp only as members of a work party to 
provide cheap labor […] the inmates are stripped of volition […] provided with (minimal) 
food and shelter, their lack of self-determination and privacy strips them of human dignity” 
(149). These institutions of Empire, by stripping people of their volition, self-determination 
and human dignity, enact a sort of anti-bildung or un-becoming; it is no wonder, then, that for 
Michael to leave these camps is an achievement, a chance at freedom, at living: “Perhaps the 
truth is that it is enough to be out of the camps, out of all the camps at the same time. 
Perhaps that is enough of an achievement, for the time being” (182). 
 Coetzee’s critique of Empire in Life & Times of Michael K centers on the 
dehumanizing, repressive social structures and agents of these institutions or camps. One of 
these agents is the medical officer who tries to make Michael speak, to make him fill the 
room with words. For Susan Heider, the confrontation between Michael and the medical 
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officer makes visible the ways in which an aggressive Empire manifests in the individual, in 
that, the medial officer’s attempts to make Michael speak are a form of repression. In this 
way, Heider lays bare Coetzee’s radical stance, his critique of Empire: “When K does not 
respond, the doctor’s mentality becomes that of a torturer […] The doctor’s sadism attempts 
to force a story from K, a story which would be his victory. He frames his questioning of K 
in terms of torture […] while he does not use violence […] he badgers K with words, his 
torture-machines of meaning” (88-89). In his refusal to talk, his refusal to grant the medical 
doctor his “victory”, Michael attempts to avoid the repressive side of Empire’s structures of 
society, communication, history and economics. Coetzee, I argue, does not simply scorn 
Empire and its repressive structures but imagines a real alternative. In this chapter, I propose 
that, through his depiction of Michael K, Coetzee reveals how refusing to participate in 
Empire can reveal a new mode of life, a new community constituted by an ethical 
relationship to the dirt underneath our feet. 
 The eponymous hero of Life & Times of Michael K is marked out from birth, as a 
result of being born with a harelip “curled like a snail’s foot, the left nostril gaped” (3). His 
deformity leaves him with a distorted speech, and he appears to be mentally handicapped, as 
his mind “was not quick” (4). These defects leave him socially isolated, with no friends, 
women or otherwise. At the beginning of the novel he is employed as a gardener. His sick 
old mother, Anna K, is a servant in Cape Town. Dying from “dropsy”, she begs Michael to 
take her “home” to a farm in Prince Albert, Karoo, where she was born the child of 
laborers. Hoping to return his mother and escape the full-scale civil war in South Africa, 
Michael travels while pushing his mother in a wheelbarrow, but before they get very far she 
dies. Michael travels on alone, with the new goal of taking his mother’s ashes to Prince 
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Albert. He finds the home abandoned, and lives there, tending pumpkin seeds, until 
frightened off by the arrival of an army deserter. Thereafter, he is commandeered to a forced 
labor camp; he returns to the farm only to be captured by the army; and, he is kept in the 
hospital of a “rehabilitation” camp for suspected rebels. Throughout these events, Michael 
keeps returning to the farm, in hopes of living in harmony with nature. It is at the hospital 
where he meets the medial officer, who tries to bestow charity on him, which he resists 
before escaping. Back in Cape Town, he encounters some pimps and prostitutes, who treat 
him as an object of charity. Alone at the end of the novel, Michael envisions a scene in 
which he helps an old man obtain water. In that way, Michael reasons, “one can live” (184). 
Life & Times of Michael K, much like Waiting for the Barbarians, thus, records an individual’s 
confrontation with the brutal ideals and methods of Empire. 
 Unlike the protagonist of that novel, the Magistrate, Michael is never complicit in the 
mode of knowing and style of reasoning characteristic of Empire. The Magistrate begins his 
narrative excavating ruins and seeking a metaphysical truth; Michael also lives with his nose 
to the ground, but his nose is planted firmly in the soil, as he labors as a gardener. Through 
gardening, by living with, even in nature, Michael attempts to evade Empire and its 
institutions. In fact, Michael dreams of burrowing into the earth, away, not just from 
Empire, but all of society.  This desire to leave mankind is evident in Michael’s belief that he 
is not simply a gardener but an animal or insect: “I am more like an earthworm, he thought. 
Which is also a kind of gardener. Or a mole, also a gardener, that does not tell stories 
because it lives in silence” (182). Here, then, we see another possibly crucial difference 
between the Magistrate and Michael: whereas the Magistrate ultimately rebelled against 
Empire, Michael seems to rebel against all of society, all of mankind. Thus, the question 
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becomes, whether or not in his life as a gardener, Michael can ever plant the seeds of 
resistance. 
 Whether this act of gardening can ultimately be understood as opposed to Empire, 
as rebellious, has been the subject of much criticism. Critics have tended to read Michael’s 
gardening in one of two ways: a liberatory politics, or oppositely a politics of refusal, in the 
vein of Bartelby from Herman Melville’s famous short story, “Bartelby, the Scrivener”, in 
which Bartelby famously repeats, I would prefer not to. The critics, who read this act as a 
refusal, read it as the development of a failed or incomplete project that prevents Michael 
from fully opposing Empire. In an early review of the novel, “The Idea of Gardening: Life 
and Times of Michael K by J. M. Coetzee”, Nadine Gordimer argues that Coetzee “does not 
believe in the possibility of blacks establishing a new regime that will do much better” (142). 
Along these same lines, Michael Valdez Moses does not believe that Michael, one of these 
“blacks”, can ever take a political stand, “without a strong desire for recognition, which takes 
the form of the demand to have one’s human dignity publicly acknowledged, K cannot take 
political activity very seriously” (143) For Moses, by not feeling “much care for what others 
think of him”, Michael “is finally indifferent to social and political demands for justice” 
(143). More recently, in their book Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri interpret 
Michael as approaching “the level of naked universality: ‘a human soul above and beneath 
classification,’ being simply homo tantum” and therefore in the end too close to “the edge of 
the abyss”, too “solitary”, and too much “on the verge of suicide” to complete a liberatory 
project of resistance. 
 In this chapter, I propose an alternative reading. Coetzee does not depict Michael’s 
development or transformation with overt moments of revelation that make his 
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development easy to grasp. He does not imbue Michael’s narrative with obvious political 
overtones. Neither does Michael’s development occur gradually throughout the novel. 
Rather, his development is delayed, only taking place at the very end of the novel. Therefore, 
while it is tempting to say that Michael does not change, and is never, in the end, able to 
become a figure of resistance and liberation, such a reading would miss the positives, his 
ultimate status as a “hero” (Coetzee 121). Michael does not simply remain an isolated, 
voiceless wanderer, instead Coetzee shows us what a position between the extremes of 
silence and interpolation in Empire might look, how such a position might be lived. I argue 
that, through a confrontation with shame, Michael experiences a “therapy of humiliation” 
that allows him to gain a voice predicated on keeping one’s nose “to the ground”, and living 
with nature. By narrating his story, Michael shows us the real possibility for a future built on 
personal agency and shared existence. 
 Throughout the novel, various people attempt to write or speak for Michael. Mike 
Marais, in his book Secretary of the Invisible, reads the story as “a series of replicated episodes, 
each of which brings Michael K into contact with a character that attempts to assert himself 
by negating K’s alterity” (108). In this way, these characters attempt to make Michael known, 
to efface his alterity, his otherness so as to place him in a narrative that they recognize and 
understand. For them, Michael, marked as different and lesser from birth, appears to be 
from another order of life. As a subaltern, he is conceived of as other than human, as a 
different order of being all together. It is no surprise, then, that Michael is thought of as a 
threat, as someone who needs to be contained: “People in a marginal state, placeless, left out 
of the social patterning, become sources of danger because their status is undefinable” 
(Newman 129). 
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 Michael’s undefinablity is reflected in Coetzee’s prose. As Gallagher points out, in 
Coetzee’s “grammatical and syntactic construction, disembodied voices speak, hands hold 
out green cards, sentences repeatedly begin in Hemingwayesque fashion: ‘It was’” (148). 
Furthermore, Coetzee’s use of passive voice, an aspect of style he has written extensively 
about, lends to a sense of a lack of agency. This disembodied voice and lack of agency are 
not surprisingly characteristic of Michael in Life & Times of Michael K. Derek Attridge notes 
that “phrases like ‘He thought’ are frequently resorted to, conditionally reminding us that we 
are outside Michael K’s consciousness […] this stylistic choice – together with the use of the 
past tense – allows Coetzee to sustain throughout the fiction the otherness of K’s responses” 
(50), an otherness that attempts are continually being made at, by the agents in the story – 
the representatives of “the system” – to contain. 
 These agents often speak at Michael rather than to or with him. This failure in 
communication is best exemplified when Michael deals with the obtaining or presentation of 
“permits”, which function as his identity to the authorities of Empire and as a means of 
freedom to commute. When attempting to depart from the city, Michael is asked for a 
permit that he clearly does not have, to which the corporal responds, “I don’t care who you 
are, who your mother is, if you haven’t got a permit you can’t leave the area, finished” (23). 
For Hania A. M. Nasheef, “Michael K fails to understand why the authorities refuse to listen 
to him. Rules pinned on the door of the orphanage, unbending laws that officials refuse to 
explain, continuously talked at, and urged to be quiet, are the very practices that he has been 
brought up on and exposed to all his life. When the practice is slightly altered, he fails to 
respond” (30). Michael lives an alienated existence. He fails to develop any relationships with 
others, admitting, early in the novel, to not having women friends, and, later, running away 
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from the army deserter, boss Visagie’s grandson, a possible friend and accomplice, when he 
comes to the home at Prince Albert. Crucially, this failure to form relationships manifests in 
Michael’s day-to-day life, as he is unable to adjust to the changing conditions of life. 
 Michael’s worsening alienation from Empire and its agents, and outside existence in 
general manifests as silence. This characteristic is one of his most remarkable and revealing 
because unlike many of Coetzee’s other central characters, such as Mrs. Curren in Age of Iron 
and David Lurie in Disgrace, who are effusive and verbose, endlessly chronicling their inner 
lives and the world around them, Michael does not tell his own story. In using a third-person 
limited point of view, Coetzee gives us access to Michael’s mind but preserves Michael’s 
silence. This characteristic is largely a reflection of his childhood. His mother, Anna K, 
rejected him at birth due to his harelip, kept him away from other children, and taught him 
that his main purpose in life was to take care of her, which resulted in him spending his 
childhood “learning to be quiet” (4). The absence of his father, meanwhile, also, according 
to Teresa Dovey, forced him to live in a world of silence: “There is no father, so K remains 
subjected to the mother’s desire, and in, a sense, outside language, relegated to the realm of 
silence” (297-298). 
 Michael’s retreat from speaking, from language is soon followed by a retreat to and 
into nature. In his retreat from society, Michael, for Marais, “does not simply yield himself 
up the land, but is actually drawn into the land, such that he soon becomes part of the land” 
(44). Michael imitates the land, and in the process his body and even his inner world begin to 
conform to the outer world, nature. Michael describes South Africa as a place of rocks rather 
than of foliage: “[H]e thought of an earth more vegetal than mineral, composed of last year’s 
rotted leaves and the year’s before and so on […] I have lost my love for that kind of earth, 
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he thought […] It is no longer the green and brown that I want but the yellow and red; not 
the wet but the dry; not the dark but the light; not the soft but the hard” (92-93). Crucially, 
at the end of the novel, Michael becomes like his conception of South Africa, a “hard little 
stone barely aware of its surroundings, enveloped in itself and its interior life” (185). Michael 
becomes the landscape. 
 Michael’s retreat from the world also brings him precariously close to a retreat from 
life itself. In retreating from language and submerging himself in the environment, Michael 
begins to dissolve. Through a series of ever-growing states of sleep, dreaming and 
hallucinations, Michael begins to lose his sense of himself: “It occurred to him that he might 
not be fully in possession of himself” (119). Unable to give voice to this thoughts and 
feelings, and living in a malnourished, underfed body, Michael does begin to lose possession 
of his self. For Anton Leist, Michael has lost the content and meaning of his life: “[E]ven if 
he is not […] losing his life in the biological sense, he is losing his grip on it and with it every 
humanely lived life. He meshes with the earth […] Of course, eventually every human 
meshes with the earth, but for Michael this is strikingly visible even while he is alive” (202). 
Whereas, the Magistrate’s thoughts often drifted to suicide, and the tortures he endured 
brought him precariously close to death, he always pressed on, even, during his 
imprisonment, even, as he says, recovering “a spirit of outrage” (110). With Michael, his grip 
on life always seems tenuous, as if he has already let go and is situated at the limits of living, 
where man becomes nature and life becomes death. 
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 This linking of Michael’s alterity to death connects him to what Lacan calls Das ding, 
or “the Thing”4.  The Lacanian Thing appears at a point where the phenomenal world 
collapses: “The Ding is the element that is initially isolated by the subject in his experience of 
the Nebenmensch [or neighbor] as being by its nature, alien, Fremde […] Das ding is that which I 
call the beyond-of-the-signified” (Lacan, The Ego in Freud’s Theory 52-54). The Thing lies 
radically beyond what is symbolically representable. Michael embodies these same 
characteristics in the way he stands at the limit where the symbolic system stands on the 
verge of collapsing. Michael qua Thing thereby represents the boundary where sense and 
nonsense separate. That is, Michael demonstrates that desire is aimed at a point beyond all 
possible experience, all possible meaning giving, the beyond, Jenseits. 
 Michael refuses to be signified. He cannot be grasped, as his life has been a series of 
referrals. Through his silence, Michael has eluded the authoritative discourse of Empire. Its 
agents have “failed to grasp him in the present, or signify him through a past; he will 
continually exist as a deferred presence, resisting signification” (Nasheef 36). In this way, 
Michael is like a deconstructed sign that is continually deferred. Derrida writes that “when 
the present cannot be presented, we signify, we go through the detour of the sign. We take 
or give sings. We signal. The sign, in this sense, is deferred presence” (A Derrida Reader: 
between the Blinds 59). Paradoxically, then, Michael qua Thing can be understood as not yet 
born. That is, in his failure to be present, Michael has yet to be called into existence: “Always 
when he tried to explain himself to himself, there remained a gap, a hole, a darkness before 
which his understanding baulked, into which it was useless to pour words. The words were 
                                                
4 Lacan’s notion of “the Thing” draws on various thinkers, most notably Freud’s use of the 
same concept, Heidegger’s lecture on “the Thing” and Immanuel Kant’s “Thing-in-itself”, 
but for the purposes of my argument, I will be focusing solely on the Lacanian Thing. 
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eaten up, the gap remained” (150-151). Coetzee, supports this notion that Michael is still to 
be born, as he writes, “There is a sense in which Michael K cannot die” (464). But, what 
does this mean that Michael is not born? How are we to interpret this absence of life? As we 
shall, see Michael, though humiliation, is (re)born, by becoming aware of his body and 
developing a voice.  
 Throughout the novel, Michael lives in a state of shame or humiliation. Michael is 
humiliated by his physical appearance. Michael is also humiliated by his inability to speak. 
Additionally, Michael is humiliated by others’ perception of him as a “simpleton”. Still, there 
is one particular episode in which Michael is particularly humiliated. In one of the final 
episodes of the novel, Michael meets two pimps and their prostitutes. One of the pimps 
pressures him into drinking alcohol, wine and brandy, which cause the derelict Michael to 
vomit and become dizzy. Then, one of the prostitutes seduces Michael, an act that causes 
him to feel much shame and humiliation: “Against his will the memory returned of the 
casque of silver hair bent over his sex, and the grunting of the girl as she labored on him. I 
have become an object of charity, he thought. Everywhere I go there are people wanting to 
exercise their forms of charity on me. All these years, and still I carry the look of an orphan” 
(181). In this sexual act, Michael is made to feel like a child, like someone helpless who needs 
others’ charity to survive. After spending the majority of the novel attempting to be self-
sufficient and independent, free of society and humanity, he still has yet to gain the 
recognition or respect of others. This realization is as humiliating as any occurrence in 
Michael’s life. 
 The effect of this humiliation is that it makes Michael aware of his body. After this 
event, Michael considers the physical tortures he has endured, the story of his life that he 
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would tell others: “I would have told a story of a life passed in prisons where I stood day 
after day, year after year with my forehead pressed to the wire, gazing into the distance, 
dreaming of experiences I would never have, and where the guards called me names and 
kicked my backside and sent me to scrub the floor” (181). Where Michael once tried to live 
outside of his body, allowing it to shrivel to bare bones, and live not simply in but like 
nature, like the plants and rocks, he now considers the pain, physical traumas and 
humiliations that his body has endured. It is through this acknowledgement of the body, the 
physical, that Michael begins to progress from a life teetering on death, a life lived for 
oneself, to a life lived in the world and with others. According to Moses, “[t]he simplest needs 
of the body and the most apolitical and solitary occupations contain the seeds of civilization, 
with all its burdens and sorrows” (151). In this way, the brute physical existence of the body 
supplies the corporeal link between Michael and civilization. Thus, while it has been argued 
that Michael’s humiliating experience with the pimps and prostitutes causes Michael to 
become “the derelict so familiar to South African eyes […] the type of non-person that we 
are used to closing our consciences to” (Muller 13), I argue that his humiliation finally allows 
him to become a person with a body that he and other must be aware of, and with bonds to 
civilization and humanity, and, as we shall see, a voice. 
 Michael’s humiliation allows him to gain a voice. How so? From his mother’s death 
to forced labour and torture to the sex act with the prostitute, Michael has experienced a 
series of traumas. The effect of these traumas is a closing up of Michael’s psychic life and 
reservoir. For Sigmund Freud, “trauma is characterized by an influx of excitations that is 
excessive by the standard of the subject’s tolerance and capacity to master such excitations 
and work them out psychically” (Laplanche and Pontalis 465). One useful way of working 
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out these traumatic excitations is by giving voice to them. We hear the birth of such a voice, 
when Michael reflects, immediately after the departure of the pimps and prostitutes, on his 
identity: “It excited him, he found, to say, recklessly, the truth, the truth about me. ‘I am a 
gardener,’  he said again, aloud” (181-182). At the end of the novel, then, Michael finally 
realizes his essence that the medical officer earlier urged him to discover. That is, Michael 
finally talks, filling the silence with words, giving himself some substance. In this way, then, 
his humiliating experience with the prostitute acts therapeutically. 
 Crucially, Michael’s voice carries important political valances. Throughout the course 
of the novel, Michael is drawn with little to no agency. Instead, it is the institutions of 
Empire that are bequeathed with agency to affect change and order the world. This dynamic 
changes at the precise moment Michael speaks. As if speaking to the institutions and agents 
of Empire, Michael says:  
 They want me to open my heart and tell them the story of a life lived in cages. 
 They want to hear about all the cages I have lived in, as if I were a budgie or a 
 white mouse or a monkey. And if I had learned storytelling at Huis Norenius instead 
 of potato-peeling and sums, if they had made me practice the story of my life every 
 day, standing over me with a cane till I could perform without stumbling, I might 
 have know how to please them. (181) 
Crucially, Michael does not “please them” when he speaks. Having been taught storytelling 
not by Empire but rather in spite of Empire, Michael does not speak about the cages he has 
lived in but instead speaks about the time he spent with his nose “to the ground”. In the 
most direct and deliberate statement made by Michael in the novel, he identifies himself as a 
gardener. Michael politicizes his voice and thereby himself by identifying himself as living 
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such a role. For Gallagher, the presentation of the gardening theme is a revision of the 
enduring South African myth of a return to the land, which suggests that the garden is 
proposed “as a millennial alternative to the cataclysm of the camps” (156). Thus, Michael’s 
gardening is set-up as a geopolitical challenge to Empire as his discourse is linked to the 
colonial issue of the control of space. In his refusal to speak about cages and his refusal to 
cede control of nature over to Empire through his gardening, Michael becomes a political 
figure, a figure of potential resistance and liberation. 
 Michael’s statement that he lives with his nose to the ground is crucial because the 
soil plays an important thematic role in Michael’s political vision. The soil is necessary for 
Michael’s gardening and thereby his vision for a new history. According to Gordimer, in 
South Africa, the death of the soil is tantamount to the end of life: “the presence of the 
threat not only of mutual destruction of whites and blacks in South Africa, but of killing, 
everywhere, by scorching, polluting, neglecting, charging with radioactivity, the dirt beneath 
our feet” (143). It is imperative, then, that soil be kept at the forefront of our concern. It is 
on the land, for Michael, that one should live, as the purest joy that Michael experiences is 
the taste of a pumpkin he grows from the soil. In keeping alive the possibility of gardening, 
Michael envisions a new history for the land of South Africa, an alternative form of freedom 
and peace. 
 An illustration of this new history emerges at the end of the novel. Michael considers 
how he would plant seeds in the future: “[M]y mistake was to plant all my seeds together in 
one patch. I should have planted them one at a time spread out over miles of veld in patches 
of soil no larger than my hand, and drawn a map and kept it with me so that every night I 
could make a tour of the sites to water them” (183). Michael’s future vision is contained in a 
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seed. Hope, for him, is a seed. Through a seed Michael can share the bounty of the earth, 
and the salvation that comes from keeping the earth alive. Through the relationship of the 
gardener to the earth, the hope of salvation is manifested in a seed, and in these relationships 
we see, what Michael calls, “the moral of it all […] the moral of the whole story” (183). Kelly 
Hewson perhaps best explicates Michael’s morality, his prophetic vision, his envisioned 
future: “[T]he novel points to a possibility […] that through creative, cooperative enterprise, 
a community can be founded. It need not posit a rural utopia, this idea of tending earth, but 
suggests a means of achieving some personal power, independence and interdependence 
against a backdrop which denies individual integrity and privacy” (68). Like the image of 
Michael spreading out his seeds, his vision constitutes just one possibility for a future of 
personal agency and healthy community. After all, the future will not be one solitary voice, 
not one envisioning, but a cacophony of voices, a myriad of imaginings that will plant the 
seeds of resistance in the minds of those once written on and spoken for by the authoritative 
discourse of Empire. In this multitude, Michael prophesizes, a new viable community will be 
formed. 
 Life & Times of Michael K ends with a dream vision, in which Michael returns to the 
country with a companion, “a little old man with a stoop”, with whom he will share a bed 
and for whom he will obtain water from the demolished pumps with a teaspoon and a string, 
and thereby share the bounty of the earth. As such, far from treading on the verge of suicide, 
both physical and socially, by preferring not to, Michael plants the seeds of resistance in his 
imagining of a new future. Crucially, this imagining is constituted by the creation of a real 
alternative. After all, this alternative arises from nature, both the rich soil on the ground and 
the love in Michael’s heart for gardening, which, he says, “is my nature” (176). As such, 
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Michael imagines an alternative to the repressive institutions and agents of Empire, an 
alternative that leads not toward the naked life of homo tantum but toward homohomo, humanity 
square, which will be enriched by the earth, the collective will, and, above all, love of the 
community. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Desiring Responsibly and Living 
“Beautifully” in Dark Times in Disgrace  
 
 “I can’t run my life according to whether or not you like what I do. Not any more. 
You behave as if everything I do is part of the story of your life. You are the main character. 
I am the minor character who doesn’t make an appearance until halfway through. Well, 
contrary to what you think, people are not divided into major and minor. I am not minor”, 
says Lucy Lurie admonishing her father David Lurie, the protagonist of J. M. Coetzee’s 
Disgrace (198). Set in South Africa in 1997 or 1998, this 1999 novel, for which Coetzee won 
his second Booker prize, generated an extraordinary level of critical commentary upon its 
release for being the first significant diagnostic reflection from an established South African 
writer of the “new South Africa” – a post-1994 South Africa, a post-apartheid South Africa. 
Coetzee’s diagnosis finds an Empire in flux, a nation in a state of shock, trauma, inconsolable 
melancholia. “So overwhelming still is the raw presence of the past”, explains Vilishani 
Cooppan, “so unfinished the business of coming to terms with it, redressing it, 
memorializing it, and changing it” (200). Coetzee openly casts doubt on the possibility of 
achieving closure on a painful past, of ever finding atonement or healing, by envisioning this 
national moment of seeming liberation not as “apartheid’s vaunted end but as a rupture in 
progressive temporality altogether” (Cooppan 209). Lucy’s reproval of her father reflects this 
South African moment of limbo, this temporal rupturing: where there were once clear 
delineations between “major” and “minor” characters, such solidity has now melted into air. 
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Lucy recognizes the artificiality of such divisions or ordering and thereby the limitations of 
the mores – language, racial classification, authority – of Empire. Her sentiments echo the 
Lyotardian postmodern skepticism of “grand narratives”. In this vein, Lucy’s sentiments also 
cast doubts on the positive, liberating hopes of these “grand narratives” for the poor, the 
ignorant, and the oppressed. Accordingly, she casts doubts on the emancipatory potential of 
the “new”, post-apartheid South Africa. 
 Disgrace depicts a “new South Africa”, with its altered environment, its changed 
attitude, its new way of doing things. Not surprisingly, the characters often speak about 
“these days”, as if they are trying to understand and come to terms with the changes 
occurring around them. At the beginning of the novel, David speculates about the life of 
Soraya, the prostitute who he meets every Thursday at two p.m.: that she may work for the 
escort agency one or two afternoons a week and otherwise live a respectable life in the 
suburbs “would be unusual for a Muslim”, he finds, “but all things are possible these days” (3; 
emphasis added). Lurie’s own career as an academic has also changed with the times: “Once 
a professor of modern languages, he has been, since Classics and Modern Languages were 
closed down as part of the great rationalization, adjunct professor of communications […] 
He has never been much of a teacher; in this transformed and, to his mind, emasculated 
institution of learning he is more out of place than ever” (3-4). For Derek Attridge, these 
changes to the varied domains of religion, sex and educational policy are implicit critiques of 
those in South Africa who control these policies to resist broader, global shifts in attitudes 
and expectations. As such, the changes to these domains add credence to notion that “the 
change from a racist to a democratic political system has made little difference” (Attridge 
101). 
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 Soon, the novel’s representation of “the times” takes on a darker complexion. David 
articulates the changed South African moral landscape with an anger and sarcasm that 
typifies his speech: “A risk to own anything: a car, a pair of shoes, a packet of cigarettes. Not 
enough to go around, not enough cars, shoes, cigarettes. Too many people, too few things. 
What there is must go into circulation […] That is how one must see life in this country: in 
its schematic aspect […] Cars, shoes; women too” (98).  David’s assessment of 
contemporary, post-apartheid South Africa with its capitalistic circulation of “goods” 
mirrors the landscape of racist, colonial, apartheid South Africa, particularly in his final 
comment concerning women. This circulation of women in the new South Africa mimics 
the relationship of acquired land and the “procured sexual object”, as the colonial ransacking 
of land often accompanied the acquisition of women, who were generally considered part of 
the booty; ravaging of the land, thereby, is akin to the ravaging of the body of the native, 
specifically the female (Nashef 105). According to Hania A. M. Nashef: “The relationship 
towards the land by the colonizer affects the way the colonized begins to view his own land. 
The colonized begins to internalize the colonizer’s views” (106). Violence perpetrated by the 
colonizer begets violence perpetrated by the colonized, an imitation that manifests during 
decolonization. For Fanon: “Decolonization is the veritable creation of new men. But this 
creation owes nothing of its legitimacy to any supernatural power; the ‘thing’ which has been 
colonized becomes man during the same process by which it frees itself” (28). The violence 
in post-apartheid South Africa can thereby best be understood as a consequence of years of 
cruelty and violent oppression, constructed, as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari might put 
it, “on the ruins of the territorial and the despotic” (333). 
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 Coetzee’s portrayal of a traumatized South Africa is an indictment of apartheid and 
colonialism. The residual effect of this colonialism is a state caught in a powerful breach of 
time, haunted by its past and unable to fully enter the future. Time, Coetzee observed in a 
1984 interview, had been 
 extraordinarily static […since] the party of Afrikaner Christian nationalism came 
 to power and set about stopping or even turning back the clock […] tried to stop 
 dead or turn around a range of developments normal (in the sense of being the 
 norm) in colonial societies […] instituting a sluggish no-time in which an already 
 anachronistic order of patriarchal clans and tribal despotism would be frozen in 
 place. (209) 
A major consequence of this “sluggish no-time” or breach of temporality is psychological, 
which Coetzee’s psychosocial critique demonstrates in the ways in which colonial violence 
dehumanizes everyone who is exposed to it.  In an early review of Disgrace, Jane Taylor 
relates Coetzee’s treatment of the cycle of colonial violence in post-apartheid South Africa to 
the Enlightenment’s legacy of the autonomy of the human subject, with each individual 
living consciousness alienated from other consciousness. The new South Africa, for Taylor, 
is characterized by a lack of ethical human relations. That is, individuals lack respect, 
sympathy and compassion for other human beings. While, as we have seen in Waiting for the 
Barbarians and Life & Times of Michael K, Coetzee mistrusts collectives, particularly the 
institutions of Empire, in Disgrace, Coetzee figures the ethical response to these institutions 
and their residual effects in the day-to-day, the individual, the psychological. For him, the 
moment of liberation can only be conjured by living in the present, with others. In this 
chapter, I propose that, through his depiction of David Lurie, Coetzee reveals how 
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sloughing off Enlightenment-based notions of the autonomy of the human subject can be 
transformative, allowing for a shift from a narcissistic outlook to an awareness of others, an 
openness to the world, and a valuing of otherness. 
 Disgrace tells the story of David Lurie, a white, fifty-two and twice-divorced 
professor. Once a professor of Modern Languages, specializing in the Romantic poets, he 
now works in the Department of Communications at Cape Technical University in Cape 
Town. At the beginning of the story David claims to have “solved the problem of sex rather 
well”, through his meetings with Soraya (1). Their relationship ends when David sees Soraya 
with her two boys in the city, which leads to “a growing coolness [between them] as she 
transforms herself into just another woman and him into just another client”, before 
eventually she stops returning him phone calls (7). Thereafter, he has three sexual encounters 
with his student Melanie Isaacs. Although he pleads guilty before the University committee, 
Lurie refuses to confess “from his heart” (54), with a “spirit of repentance” (58). As a result, 
he loses his job, leaving Cape Town in disgrace, and ends up living with his estranged 
daughter, Lucy, who is homesteading in the country, growing flowers, gardening produce, 
and keeping dog kennels. David tries to mend his relationship with her while working at the 
local animal clinic with Lucy’s friend Bev Shaw. In a vicious attack, three men rape Lucy, 
David is beaten and burned, and the dogs are shot dead. David is certain that Petrus, Lucy’s 
black neighbor, is behind the attack and wants to take over her land. Thereafter, David 
becomes absorbed in his work at the animal clinic, feeding, cleaning, treating, killing animals, 
and even speaking and caring for them in their final moments. Also, while at first outraged 
with his daughter for refusing to report the rape and abort the child she now carries, he 
comes to accept her choices and new life. The novel ends with David working on a chamber 
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opera about Romantic poet Lord Byron in Italy, and helping to kill a dog dear to him that he 
has come to love. 
 At the heart of this narrative are the two rapes: David’s rape of Melanie, and the 
gang rape of Lucy, David’s daughter, which begins David’s descent into a state of disgrace. 
The text constructs a parallel between the two acts. Elleke Boehmer has argued that “the 
structural symmetries of the narrative […] align Lurie’s self-styled seduction […] with the 
gang rape of his daughter […] White dominance and the overcoming of white dominance are 
both figured as involving the subjection of the female body, as part of a long history of 
female exploitation of which the narrative itself takes note” (344). Lucy figures David in this 
subjection, by implicating her father in the rape: “You are a man, you ought to know. When 
you have sex with someone strange—when you trap her, hold her down, get her under you, 
put all your weight on her—isn’t it a bit like killing? Pushing the knife in; exiting afterwards, 
leaving the body behind covered in blood—doesn’t it feel like murder, like getting away with 
murder?” (158). It is no surprise, then, as Ido Geiger posits, that the novel “does not at all 
contend with rape either in legal terms or in the terms of moral law as they are ordinarily 
understood […rather] what is at issue is an entirely personal wrong” (147; emphasis added). 
Disgrace is a bildung, charting the development of David’s consciousness and conscience. 
Specifically, the narrative is driven forward by David’s acceptance of Lucy’s rape, both in 
relation to his own past misdeeds and the ways in which she lives with the effects. 
 Late in the novel, Lucy discusses whether she loves her unborn child: “Love will 
grow – one can trust Mother Nature for that. I am determined to be a good mother, David. 
A good mother and a good person. You should try to be a good person too” (216). To 
which David thinks: “A good person. Not a bad resolution to make, in dark times” (216). 
  52 
Whether David becomes a “good person”, whether he is transformed, has been the subject 
of much criticism. Critics have tended to focus their attention on David’s, largely failed, 
attempts to sympathize and identify with Lucy in the aftermath of the assault. In Secretary of 
the Invisible: The Idea of Hospitality in the Fiction of J. M. Coetzee a critical collection on Coetzee’s 
fiction, Mike Marais argues that David can never “know” Lucy, as he, like her rapists, is 
“guilty of a similiar failure of the imagination, since he is “inspired by the position […he 
occupies] in history’s economy of exchange” (182). For Marais, then, David fails to develop 
a sympathetic imagination. A.M. Nashef, who like me reads the novel through the paradigm 
of humiliation, contends that while David can “comprehend the pain that has been inflicted 
on his daughter, he can not begin to comprehend “what the rape of the female entails” (108) 
Finally, Angeleke Boehmer reads Lucy’s passivity in the aftermath of the rape not as a 
redemptive otherness, but rather as simply that passivity, even from redemption, a passivity 
that David cannot relate to. 
 In this chapter, I propose an alternative reading. Coetzee, much like with the 
Magistrate and Michael K, paints his portrait of David Lurie with subtle stokes that make his 
development difficult to grasp. As with the Magistrate, who ends up in the same position at 
the end of his narrative as a functionary of Empire, and Michael K, who experiences the 
episode of humiliation with the prostitute very late in his narrative, in Disgrace, Coetzee 
similarly does not imbue David’s bildung with an obvious arc, as he remains “open” to the 
end of the narrative. While it is tempting to say that this openness reflects David’s 
unfinished development, such a reading would miss his moral growth and, his resulting new 
relation to the world and outlook on life: “[t]he attention to a main character that many 
readers find unlikeable at the very least, in his deep resistance to responsiveness and 
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‘answerability’ to others […can be read as an] act of love on Coetzee’s part” (Faber 310). 
David does not simply maintain the same position in this new South Africa, instead Coetzee 
shows us how a finding an “interstitial non-position” in this society might lead to the 
acquisition of a new language, and how this new position might look, might be lived. I argue 
that, through a confrontation with abjection and death, David experiences a “therapy of 
humiliation” that opens him up to a less egotistical and narcissistic perspective predicated on 
an openness to otherness, and a new-found agency with respect to his own desire. By 
loosening his grip on his own ego, David at long last opens himself to others, both human 
and animal, and the possibility of love. 
 David Lurie, at the beginning of the novel, is wholly a product of a problematic 
language and colonial system. His complicity with an outdated and outmoded way of 
knowing and style of reasoning reveals itself early on with respect to David’s fading career. 
His publishing career has failed to establish him as a leading voice in his field of Modern 
Languages, with an emphasis on the Romantics: “[H]e has published three books, none of 
which has caused a stir or even a ripple: the first on opera (Boita and the Faust Legend: The 
Genesis of Mefistophele), the second on vision as eros (The Vision of Richard of St Victor), the third 
on Wordsworth and history (Wordsworth and the Burdens of the Past)” (4). Furthermore, having 
been reassigned as a professor of communication, David ironically has a difficult time 
communicating and relating to his students. Whereas David writes and teaches about dead 
poets, his students are more concerned with contemporary literature. For instance, one of 
the students from his Romantics course, Melanie Isaacs, is more interested in contemporary 
feminist authors, such as Adrienne Rich, Toni Morrison, and Alice Walker. David increasing 
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sense of alienation leads him to see his students as a kind of foreign race, concluding, “they 
might as well have been hatched from eggs yesterday” (32). 
 Stuck in this problematic language and colonial system, David often resorts to the 
failed discourse of Empire. Most obviously, at the beginning of the novel, he is working on a 
chamber opera based on the love life of Lord Byron. Rather than allow him to connect with 
the outside world, he admits that it will likely never see the light of day, concluding that its 
composer is “obscure and growing obscurer. A figure from the margins of history” (167). 
David and his opera both belong to a Western tradition that is becoming increasingly 
irrelevant in the new South Africa. According to Graham Pechey, Lurie strongly identifies 
with Romantic poets such as his subject Byron due to a shared overwhelming feeling of 
having been an exile in one’s own country: “Like Lurie, its male representative led 
‘imperfect’ lives and were forced out of England into more permissive climes. Lurie’s 
identification with them develops into a sharing of their fate, an exile that is in his case is 
internal” (380). Here, the dilemma of the novel, a dilemma very similar to the one the 
Magistrate faces in Waiting for the Barbarians, presents itself: whether, if we understand that 
there can be no meaning outside the order of language, the Magistrate can somehow occupy 
an autonomous place in what psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan calls the “symbolic” dimension 
or order. In other words, whether he can live in Empire without thinking or acting like 
Empire. As we shall see, David’s evolving relationship with women, particularly his daughter 
Lucy, ultimately allows him to assert his distance from the Empire and open up such a place 
or position for himself. 
 At the beginning of the novel, David is totally self-absorbed in his dealings with 
others, particularly women. Divorced twice, David has turned to seeking relationships with 
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women who are younger and not of the same status as him and thereby can help him to 
fulfill his desires and fantasies. His narcissism is evident in his relationship with Soraya. 
Despite the fact their relationship is based simply on a monetary transaction, David deceives 
himself into believing that she harbors romantic feelings for him, “at the level of 
temperament her affinity with him can surely hot be feigned” (3). David’s fantasies are soon 
shattered by a chance encounter with Soraya out with her two sons. Upon learning that her 
life extends beyond her professional commitments to him that she does not exist to fulfill his 
desires, David loses complete interest in her. As his ex-wife, Rosalind puts it: David is “a 
great self-deceiver” (188). 
  Soon, David’s desires become directed toward his student Melanie. Even younger 
than Soraya, she is in much the same way described as purely an object of desire: “She is 
small and thin, with close-cropped black hair, wide, almost Chinese cheekbones, large, dark 
eyes” (11). And, as with Soraya, Lurie’s dealings with her are completely egotistical, self-
motivated and self-fulfilling. He displays a complete lack of concern for her; she is simply an 
adjunct of his ego, someone to gratify his desires. David does not simply want to be with 
Melanie or make love to her but to own her and her beauty; as he explains to her, “a 
woman’s beauty does not belong to her alone […] she has a duty to share it” (16). Thus, 
David justifies his pathologically narcissistic and egotistical view towards women that they 
are somehow his property. He goes as far, as he watches her in a play, as to claim her success 
as his own: “When they laugh at Melanie’s lines he cannot resist a flush of pride. Mine! He 
would like to say to them” (191). 
 David’s desire to own Melanie and possess her beauty reaches its darkest and most 
violent stage when he first has sex with her. While it is never explicitly defined as sexual 
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assault, the description of the event certainly colors it in this negative light. It is described as 
a violation: “He has given her no warning; she is too surprised to resist the intruder who 
thrusts himself upon her” (24). Notably, David resists interpreting the attack as a rape: “Not 
rape, not quite that, but undesired nevertheless, undesired to the core. As though she had 
decided to go slack, die within herself for the duration, like a rabbit when the jaws of the fox 
close on its neck” (25). In fact, his justification of the event marks him as still complicit with 
a problematic language and colonial system, a Western tradition that is becoming 
increasingly irrelevant in the new South Africa. He tries to justify the event by convincing 
himself that he is “a servant of Eros: that is what he wants to say, but does he have the 
effrontery? It was a god who acted through me” (89). In this justification, David again resorts to a 
failed discourse grounded in a bygone era. Along these lines, Lucy Valerie Graham writes 
that this use of language “is a critique of the Romantic/humanist posturing that obscures, 
even justifies, forsaking ethical responsibility in the realm of life. And yet David, scholar of 
Romanticism, is guilty of ‘attitudinising’ when he excuses his violation of Melanie Isaacs as 
an act motivated by Eros, or inspired by ‘Aphrodite, goddess of the foaming waves’” (441). 
Such a forsaking of “ethical responsibility” is supported by Farodai Rassool, one of the 
committee members in the university’s inquiry into his conduct, who observes that David 
makes no mention of the pain he has caused, only allowing that he was acted upon by desire. 
 David’s attack metaphorically kills Melanie: “He sees himself in the girl’s flat, in her 
bedroom […] kneeling over her, peeling off her clothes, while her arms flop like the arms of 
a dead person” (89). But, whereas Melanie metaphorically dies, Lucy is death. Locked in the 
lavatory of Lucy’s room as she is being raped, David contemplates the possibility that Lucy 
may be dead: “He and his daughter are not being let off lightly after all! He can burn, he can 
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die; and if he can die, then so can Lucy, above all Lucy” (96). This contemplation of death 
intertextually connects Lucy to William Wordworth’s Lucy. Specifically, Coetzee’s Lucy is 
connected to the Lucy of Wordsworth’s “Strange fits of passion have I known”, a poem in 
which the male speaker upon approaching Lucy’s house, much like David, exclaims: “‘O 
mercy!’ to myself I cried, / ‘If Lucy should be dead’” (27-28). Later, Lucy directly articulates 
to David her likeness to death: “I am a dead person and I do not know yet what will bring 
me back to life” (161). This affiliation between Coetzee’s Lucy and Wordsworth’s Lucy is 
evident, apart from the shared name, “in Lurie’s scholarly interest in Wordsworth, the 
presentation of both Lucys as lost daughters from an uncomprehending male perspective, 
and their association with nature, rural existence, and the alterity of death” (Marais 184). 
 Lucy’s relation to death – a point beyond all possible experience, all possible 
meaning giving, the beyond, Jenseits – is most evident in her rape, and the consequences of 
this act. “Death”, after all, is in itself an attempt to name the unnamable to establish through 
language what is irretrievably beyond language.  While Lucy is being gang raped, David is 
trapped in the lavatory of Lucy’s homestead, locked away from the act, an act he is powerless 
to stop. As a result, David develops feelings of remorse, even complicity, as he was not able 
to save Lucy, confessing to her: “I did nothing. I did not save you” (157). David is 
humiliated. Marais contends correctly that David’s “‘imprisonment’ means that he is not able 
to witness Lucy’s violation and is thus forced to imagine it” (169). Crucially, however, David 
is not able to imagine it. Immediately after the attack, Lucy separates herself from David: 
when “he tries to take her in his arms”, she “wriggles loose” (97). Later, when David tries to 
sympathize with her, she refuses his gesture: “You don’t know what happened […] you don’t 
begin to know” (134). Even Bev Shaw supports Lucy when David argues that he “was 
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there” with her during the attack: “But you weren’t there David. She told me. You weren’t” 
(140). David, a rapist, cannot know Lucy’s story, cannot know what it feels like to be a rape 
victim, he is powerless to imagine himself in Lucy’s position. 
 David’s humiliation, therefore, centers not only on his inability to save Lucy from 
being raped but also on his inability to articulate her experience through his discourse. His 
inability to relate to her experience and her life intensifies later in the novel when she decides 
not only to keep the unborn child but also marry Petrus, becoming his third wife and 
concubine, and turning over her land to him, becoming a tenant on his land. Where once 
David could use his discourse to rationalize any situation, even rape, this act and its 
consequences leave him bereft of language, without a voice. It is Lucy who tells David how 
to survive in the new South Africa. For Lucy, one must forget the past, erase one’s memory, 
a concept David finds humiliating: “How humiliating, Such high hopes, and to end like this” 
(205). To which Lucy concurs, adding, “Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a 
good point to start from again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To start at 
ground level. With nothing. Not with nothing but. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no 
property, no rights, no dignity” (205). In this state of humiliation or disgrace, David learns 
what it means to be humble, to live with nothing, to live as simply as possible, as just a 
physical body. Confronted with a new, post-apartheid South Africa, with the loss of order, 
the distinction between “major” and “minor”, the emergence of an ethics of silence in 
response to rape, the reimagining of land and economic distribution, the uncertain possibility 
of reconciliation, David realizes that the most appropriate response to “dark times” is, as 
Tom Herron puts it, to become “imperceptible” (473), to live without “things” (205), to live 
“like a dog” (205), with humility. Humbled by the loss of his possessions, his voice, and his 
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sense of his country, Lurie comes to realize that in order to survive in the new South Africa, 
he has to come to terms with a new reality that leaves him humiliated. 
 David is reduced past shame, past knowing, past language, even past what he 
thought it meant to be human. In this way, David experiences abjection. According to Julia 
Kristeva, language, or the “symbolic”, keeps the abject at bay: “The non-distinctiveness of 
inside and outside […is] unnamable, a border passable in both directions by pleasure and 
pain. Naming the latter, hence differentiating them, amounts to introducing language, which, 
just as it distinguishes pleasure from pain as it does all other oppositions, founds the 
separation inside/outside” (61-62). Reduced to a stage preceding binary opposition and 
distinct categories, before language and naming, he is reduced to an object: he is made aware 
of his body. In this way, David begins to comprehend “the difficulty of talking about the 
body in pain” (Wenzel 64). As such, David begins to sympathize with Lucy’s violation not by 
being forced to imagine it, but through abjection or humiliation, through a violence to the 
self. 
 This experience of abjection or humiliation is therapeutic for David in that it allows 
him to both distances himself from an inadequate and problematic language and colonial 
system, and slough off the Enlightenment-based values of the autonomy of the human 
subject that characterize the Empire. In this way, David’s ego can be understood as 
subverted or undermined. As such, it must start anew, from a limited perspective, from a 
poverty of language. In this way, David must return, much like the new South Africa, to the 
basics. For Alyda Faber, “English has been corrupted by the master-slave relations that 
dominated apartheid, so that words must return to the basic alphabet” (312). Lurie notices 
this in his erratic conversation with Petrus: “Nothing short of starting over again with the 
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ABC. By the time the big words come back reconstructed, purified, fit to be trusted once 
more, he will be long dead” (129). David, thus, like the Masgistrate, experiences a Lacanian 
form of therapy. His ego, which for Lacan is a site of méconnaissance, misrecognition\, is 
subverted. But, if we understand David as subverting his ego and reason, then, what replaces 
it? That is, if David does open up an autonomous position for himself in the symbolic order, 
how does this position look? How does one live with a subverted ego? 
 David‘s new modus vivendi, mode or way of living, is revealed through his openness to 
the world and others. Where David once obsessively attempted to fit the changed 
environment, new attitude, and new way of doing things of the new South Africa into an 
increasingly irrelevant discourse founded on a Western tradition, his “therapy of 
humiliation” has opened his self-absorbed mind to an otherness that exceeds the mode of 
knowing and style of reasoning characteristic of this tradition. Michalinos Zembylas supports 
such a reading when he writes that “[t]he modus vivendi found by […David] constitutes a 
graceful position that abandons the historical categorizations that are inherited. In a sense, 
the novel takes an antihistoricist position, that is, it rejects attempts to obtain mastery over 
the past by translating it into a recognizable form […David remains] inconsolable before 
history.” (228). David finally asserts his distance from an inadequate and problematic 
language and colonial system, by relating to the world, with others with an openness, which 
serves as the foundation of his new ethical position that is evident in his relation to animals 
and humanity, the manner in which he desires, and his art. 
 David’s development towards this openness is most fully revealed through his evolving 
relationship with animals, in that, he becomes no longer oblivious to others. At the 
beginning of the novel, Lurie sided with the ancients in their belief that, unlike humans, 
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animals “don’t have proper souls” (78). For him, they were a nuisance, as they kept him 
awake at night with there barking . However, his fixed temperament and fixed mind – 
“Follow your temperament. It is not a philosophy […] it is a rule” – soon open up to the 
existence and importance of animal life (2). His affection is first gained by Katy, an 
abandoned bulldog with whom, as Attridge puts it, “he senses an obscure empathy” (107). 
Without warning, his feelings overtake him, and in “a moment that combines absurdity and 
pathos”, he falls asleep in Katy’s cage, stretched out beside her (Attridge 107). This bonding 
with animals continues with two Persian sheep that are to be slaughtered for a party that 
Petrus is throwing. David contemplates the lack of agency and emptiness of their lives: 
“Sheep do not own themselves, do not own their lives. They exist to be used, every last 
ounce of them, their flesh to be eaten, their bones to be crushed and fed to poultry” (123). 
Then, later, at the clinic, where he helps Bev Shaw to euthanize dogs, he has a difficult time 
getting used to the job: after noticing that the workers beat the bodies of the dead dogs with 
shovels to break their limbs so they can fit on the furnace conveyer belt, he begins to drive 
the dead bodies to incinerator and place them on the trolley himself. Admitting that his deed 
is good for nothing, he says he does it “for his idea of the world, a world in which men do 
not use shovels to beat corpses into a more convenient shape for processing” (146). 
 This development can best be described as identification with animals. This 
identification seems to arise out of thin air, as David, in reference to the two Persian sheep, 
is surprised by it: “A bond seems to have come into existence between himself and the two 
Persians, he does not know how. The bond is not one of affection, It is not even a bond 
with these two in particular, whom he could not pick out from a mob in a field. 
Nevertheless, suddenly and without reason, their lot has become important to him” (108). 
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David at one time equated “animal-welfare people” with “Christians of a certain kind”: 
Everyone is so cheerful and well-intentioned that after a while you itch to go off and do 
some raping and pillaging. Or to kick a cat” (73). Now, however, in identifying and 
sympathizing with animals, David displays an ethics of openness, a humility of bodily 
reduction. David gives up his romanticized ego: people are no long “major” or “minor” for 
him, as he has fused the canine and human realms, and in this way demonstrated a concern 
and openness to “otherness” through animals. Identifying with animals allows David to 
slough off an Enlightenment-based autonomy of the human subject and a discourse founded 
on an outdated Western, Romantic tradition, in favor of an awareness of the outside world 
and others outside of himself, an ethos that he now finally, at the end of the novel, “no 
longer has difficulty in calling by its proper name: love” (219). 
 This mode of living with others and openness, and burgeoning notion of love connect 
David to Antigone from Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone. Specifically, David, like Antigone, 
sheds light on the notion of the “beautiful”. For Lacan, the beautiful implies a change of 
perspective. An object, Lacan proposes, appears beautiful when it embodies the transition 
point where meaning begins to break down, at the boundary between sense and nonsense, 
the personal and impersonal. Lacan’s reading of Antigone, as such, centers on the beauty of 
its protagonist, who is beautiful because she absolves herself from everything that binds her 
to the world. Most exemplary, according to Phillipe Van Haute, is when Antigone says, “My 
brother is what he is”, because her statement can also mean, “I am only his sister, I am only 
a sister” (102). In this way, she is purified from every attachment, besides being “a sister”. 
Antigone’s desire, as such, for Lacan, is an absolutely “pure” desire. Such an unbinding from 
the world occurs at the end of Disgrace, when David sees Lucy working on the farm; David 
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thinks to himself: “What will it entail, being a grandfather? He lacks the virtues of the old: 
equanimity, kindliness, patience. But perhaps those virtues will come as other virtues go: the 
virtue of patience for instance. He must look again at Victor Hugo, poet of grandfatherhood. 
There may be things to learn” (217-218). Here, David has absolved himself of all other ties 
in the world – from his relationship with prostitutes to his occupation in academia – so as to 
be only a grandfather to Lucy’s unborn child. It is no surprise, then, that David returns to his 
daughter as a “visitor”, arriving on “new footing, a new start” (218). This new footing and 
new start mark a change in David, as he ponders what it means to be a grandfather, a new 
position for him, admitting that he may have things to learn. Here, we see David’s response 
to Lucy’s resolution to be a “good person” in “dark times”, as he has changed from living in 
a state of disgrace to living in a state of beauty. 
 David new mode of living is also revealed through the psychoanalytic notions of 
sublimation and desire. For Lacan, like Freud, sublimation is the transformation of the 
sexual drive through the creation of a work of art, so that the sexual drive is employed in a 
“socially acceptable manner”. Whereas David once descried himself as a servant of Eros, he 
now sublimates this once seemingly uncontrollable sex drive through art, specifically his 
chamber opera about Byron. Crucially, attention to the opera not only takes up more of the 
narrative at the end of the novel as David acceptably sublimates his desire, but the attention 
of the opera changes. No longer centered on Byron’s relationships with young women, 
including Teresa Guiccioli, it now concerns Teresa in middle age, after Byron has died. On 
the one hand, this shift in David’s opera reflects a shift in his moral outlook, as he has gone 
from identifying with the romantic figure to identifying with Teresa, underlining that now he 
can “find it in his heart to love this plain ordinary woman” (182). On the other hand, this 
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shift reflects a shift in his language, as he has gone from relying on a failed and archaic 
Romatnic tradition, which he employed to legitimize his abuse of Melanie, to a voice that 
displays love towards others, including dogs and the “now middle-aged” Teresa, that he was 
once closed off from. This shift in David’s opera, thereby, reflects nothing more than a 
complete shift in his agency, having learned a new kind of agency reflected in the 
sublimation of his desire to which he was once simply a passive an agent. 
 “Yes, I am giving him up”, says David Lurie in the final scene of J. M. Coetzee’s 
Disgrace. While David is referring to the dog he has come to love, the dog that like him likes 
music, he speaks in this final affirming line about much more. Having given up prostitutes 
and Romanticism, and thereby an old way of living and thinking, he has given up the 
impediments to a life with others, for others. In this final scene of death, David articulates an 
ethos of solidarity. In giving up his past, David shows the way forward for a nation still 
wounded from the traumas of apartheid, an old, violent colonial order. In this final scene, 
David has become “a dog-man: a dog undertaker; a dog psychopump; a harijan” (146). He 
has forsaken “major” for “minor”, whether it be caste or species. By coming to live a life 
based on humility, David demonstrates how we can desire responsibly and live with 
“beauty”, with sympathy, with love, as a collective, both human and animal. 
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CONCLUSION 
From Humiliation to Humility 
 
 The worlds that J.M. Coetzee paints in his novels are, above all, bleak. These 
environments punish its inhabitants, stripping them of their possessions, pride and agency 
until they are left with the bare minimum, undergoing a stripping away of their being that 
leaves them humiliated and humbled. From the nameless, placeless Empire in Waiting for the 
Barbarians to late-apartheid South Africa in Life & Times of Michal K to post-apartheid South 
Africa in Disgrace, Coetzee’s vision of civilization is unwelcoming. But Coetzee, as with his 
influences Franz Kafka and Samuel Beckett, does not ignore these worlds, his worlds that 
torture and debase and control. Coetzee, instead, critiques the unfair and violent systems that 
undergird these societies. Whether corrupt government, dictatorship, colonialism, apartheid 
or decolonization, these systems centre on acts of state violence that Coetzee posits will 
reappear in the after, the post with the demise of apartheid, as new communities may simply 
erect themselves on the charred bones of the past. In this way, Coetzee’s critiques do not 
simply look backwards with a reproachful eye but forward as well to the possibility of new 
modes of living, new forms of community. 
 At the heart of this possibility is the Coetzean character. Alienated and alone, an 
outsider, Coetzee’s characters often feel estranged from the mode of living and ways of 
reasoning endemic to Empire. In this very estrangement and alienation is birthed the 
possibility of opposing or living anew in Empire. However, these characters must deal with 
the violent means of control employed by Empire though its agents of interrogation and 
  66 
institutions of power on its subjects, namely torture. This torture and humiliation often 
leaves its victims feeling on the brink, at the limits, as they run up against the limitations of 
the body, subjectivity, history and life itself. The Magistrate, in Waiting for the Barbarians, 
articulates this position of being, even desiring to be, on the brink of nothingness, of 
impending death: “These dreamless spells are like death to me, or enchantment, blank 
outside time” (33). How these characters deal with this longing to be outside time and 
history, for a new subjectivity, for death becomes the raison d’etre of Coetzee’s novels. That is, 
as Coetzee once put it, do they “go on playing one’s part”, or come to “a new awareness” 
(Giving Offense: Essays on Censorship 15)? 
 Many critics read the bleakness of Coetzee’s world as overwhelming for his 
characters. In his recent work The Politics of Humiliation in the Novels of J.M. Coetzee, Hania A.M. 
Nasheef, reads, much like me, Coetzee’s novels through the paradigm of humiliation. 
According to Nasheef, this humiliation is not productive for the characters, as “life generally 
ends in degrading ways” (177). For him, “[t]here is no chance of exit. The awareness that 
one cannot step down at one’s own will does not bring the Coetzean figures any form of 
comic relief, but further enslavement and shame” (178). Along these same lines, Vilashini 
Cooppan argues, in her work Worlds Within: National Narratives and Global Connections in 
Postcolonial Writing, that Coetzee shows how in the postcolonial nation “liberation is still an 
unfinished project and loss remains the nations dominant mode” (xxi). For her, the 
Coetzean character relates “to history in the style of perpetually failed mourning” (213). 
 Such readings do account for much of the humiliation and mourning that occur in 
Coetzee’s novels. After all, the state of shame or disgrace, or dealing with death is not 
productive for most of the characters. The tortures that the clearly innocent fishing people 
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endure at the hands of Joll and his interrogation experts in Waiting for the Barbarians leaves 
some of them dead and many of them injured, physically and mentally. The humiliation and 
shame that Melanie faces at the hands of David Lurie in Disgrace far from healing causes her 
to stop her studies and acting, and leave school disgraced. In Life & Times of Michael K, the 
continual poverty and abject living conditions that Anna K must endure throughout her life 
eventually leads to an early grave. 
 Still, as I have argued in this thesis, torture, humiliation and abjection can be 
therapeutic for some characters, namely the protagonists of these novels. Each of these 
characters begins their narratives in similar positions with respect to Empire. The Magistrate, 
in his role as functionary of Empire, and David Lurie, through his language that is a product 
of a past colonial or apartheid system, are complicit with Empire, while Michael K, through 
his gardening, chooses to ignore Empire, a no less problematic position. Through their 
complicity and preference not to, these characters become implicated in the bleak world that 
Coetzee erects around them. Namely, they become implicated in a mind-set reminiscent of 
the “Enlightenment”, which began in Europe in the 17th-century, and from which 
colonialism partly manifested. For these characters, it is only through humiliation that they 
are able to slough off such an Enlightenment-based mind-set and free themselves from 
complicity and implication in colonialism, apartheid and Empire. 
 To be humiliated is to be shamed and humbled by agents external to oneself, by 
external forces larger than the individual, namely, at least in Coetzee’s novels, the political 
agents and institutions of Empire. While humiliation may arise from a number of factors in 
Coetzee’s works, from aging to physical disability to relationship woes, in this thesis, I have 
focused on language – particularly, the humiliation of losing one’s language. The torture that 
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the Magistrate endures, David Lurie’s failed desire to understand and relate to his daughter’s 
rape, and Michael K’s inability to express himself, all share a poverty of language, but for 
these characters this humiliation of silence therapeutically allows for the possibility of 
something new to take its place. The sloughing off of Enlightenment values necessitates the 
sloughing off of one’s entire symbolic system until one is left alone with simply the body. 
For each of these characters, living in their body without the cover of language necessitates a 
newfound ethics of humility. In this way, Coetzee asserts the importance of the physical, the 
humility of one’s own body, but also crucially the humility of the other’s body, such as when 
the Magistrate compares his relationships with the many prostitutes he has known to that 
with the barbarian girl: “"I embrace her, bury myself in her, lose myself in her soft bird-like 
flurries. The body of the other one, closed, ponderous, sleeping on my bed in a faraway 
room, seems beyond comprehension. Occupied in these suave pleasures, I cannot imagine 
what ever drew me to that alien body” (45). In his contemplation of this tortured girl’s body 
we see the articulation of care, a responsibility that each of these characters comes to feel 
only after their episodes of humiliation, their loss of language, their return to the humility of 
the body – that site of pain and pleasure we all share. Thus, far from ending in a degrading 
manner or being caught in a perpetual mourning or melancholia, these characters end their 
lives anew, with the promise of an adjusted moral compass, and a newfound ethics that 
centers on humility. Through this novel morality and ethical position comes the hope for 
care directed towards the impoverished, the disgraced, the barbarian, the other, a hope that 
the humiliation that one has endured can save others from this same torture, this same fate 
to which, Coetzee’s teaches us, we are all, if we can learn to act together, not necessarily 
destined. 
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